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APPENDIXES 
 
Appendix 1: The Materialists in India, Al-'Urwa al-Wuthqa, 28 August 1884 
The English entered India and toyed with the minds of her princes and kings in a 
way that makes intelligent men both laugh and cry. They penetrated deeply into India's 
interior, and seized her lands piece by piece. Whenever they became lords of the land 
they took liberties with its inhabitants, and showed anger and contempt regarding their 
stay among them, saying that the English were occupied only with commercial 
affairs.As for tending to administration and politics, that is not their business. However, 
what calls them to bear the burdens [of administration and politics] is pity for the kings 
and the princes who are incapable of governing their dominions. When the kings or 
princes are able to control their land, no Englishman will remain there [they said], 
because they have other important affairs that they have abandoned out of sheer 
compassion. With this, the English stole property from every owner on the pretext that 
work on property is oppressive to a person and fatiguing for mind and body. It is better 
for the owner of the property to relax and to die poor and humble, free of the pains of 
management. [The English] declare that when the opportunity presents itself, and the 
time comes when the affairs of this world and the hereafter will not influence bodies 
and thoughts, they are prepared to leave the country (on the Day of Resurrection!). And 
today they are saying the very same words in Egypt!!  
When [the English] entrenched themselves in India, and effaced the traces of 
Mogul rule, they gave the land a second look, and found within it fifty million Muslims, 
each of whom was wounded in heart by the extinction of their great kingdom. They 
were connected with many millions of Muslims in the East and West, North and South. 
[The English] perceived that as long as the Muslims persisted in their religion, and as 
long as the Qur'an was read among them, it would be impossible for them to be sincere 
in their submission to foreign rule, especially if that foreigner had wrested the realm 
from them through treachery and cunning, under the veil of affection and friendship. So 
they set out to try to weaken belief in the Islamic faith in every way. They encouraged 
their clergymen and religious leaders to write books and publish tracts filled with 
defamation of the Islamic religion, and replete with abuse and vilification for the 
Founder of Islam (may God free him of what they said!). This abominable activity 
resulted in what is intolerable to human nature, and what would prevent an honorable 
man from remaining in a land where such books are published, or from living under a 
sky whose sun shines on the perpetrators of that great slander. With that they aimed 
only, on the one hand, to weaken the beliefs of the Muslims, and to induce them to 
profess the English religion. On the other hand, they began to restrict the means of 
livelihood available to the Muslims, and to intensify their oppression and disadvantages 
in every respect. They hurt their interests regarding public works, and plundered waqfs4 
set aside for mosques and madrasahs,5 and exiled their ulema and leaders to the 
Andaman and Filfilan [?] Islands, hoping to use this means, if the first one did not work, 
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to alienate the Muslims from their religion, and to reduce them to the depths of 
ignorance concerning their faith, so that they would neglect what God had ordained for 
them. When the hopes of those tyrannical rulers for the first means failed, and the 
period of profiting from the second one seemed too long, they resorted to another policy 
for the limitation or weakening of the Islamic religion in the land of India, because they 
fear only the Muslim possessors of that plundered realm and usurped right.  
It happened that a man named Ahmad Khan Bahadur (an honorary title in India) 
was hovering around the English in order to obtain some advantage from them. He 
presented himself to them and took some steps to throw off his religion and adopt the 
English religion. He began his course by writing a book demonstrating that the Torah 
and the Gospel were not corrupted or falsified, in order to ingratiate himself with the 
English. Then he considered, and saw that the English would not be satisfied with him 
until he said, "I am a Christian," and that this vile deed would not bring him a large 
reward, especially since thousands of clergymen and priests had produced books like 
his and they had [only] converted a few Muslims from their religion. So, he took 
another road in order to serve his English masters, by sowing division among the 
Muslims and scattering their unity.  
He appeared in the guise of the naturalists [materialists], and proclaimed that 
nothing exists but blind nature, and that this universe does not have a wise God (this is a 
clear error), and that all the prophets were naturalists who did not believe in the God 
taught by the revealed religions, (we take refuge in God!). He called himself a neicheri 
or naturalist, and began to seduce the sons of the rich, who were frivolous young men. 
Some of them inclined toward him, escaping from the bonds of the Law of Islam, and 
pursuing bestial passions. His doctrine pleased the English rulers and they saw in it the 
best means to corrupt the hearts of the Muslims. They began to support him, to honor 
him, and to help him to build a college in Aligarh, called the Mohammadan College, to 
be a trap in which to catch the sons of the believers in order to bring them up in the 
ideas of this man, Ahmad Khan Bahadur.  
Ahmad Khan wrote a commentary on the Qur'an and distorted the sense of 
words and tampered with what God revealed. He founded a journal called Tahdhib al-
Akhlaq that published only what would mislead the minds of the Muslims, cause 
dissension among them, and sow enmity between the Muslims of India and other 
Muslims, especially between [the Indian Muslims] and the Ottomans.  
He called openly for the abandonment of all religions (but he addressed only the 
Muslims), and cried, "Nature, Nature," in order to convince people that Europe only 
progressed in civilization, advanced in science and industry, and excelled in power and 
strength by rejecting religions and returning to the goal aimed at by all religions 
(according to his claim), which is the explanation of the ways of nature. ("He invented a 
lie against God.") When we were in India, we learned of certain weak intelligences 
misled by the hoaxes of this man and his disciples. We wrote a treatise exposing their 
corrupt doctrine and the ruin that arose from it. We established that religion is the 
foundation of civilization and the pillar of culture. Our treatise was printed in two 
languages, Hindustani and Persian.  
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Ahmad Khan and his followers removed the garb of religion and publicly called 
for its abandonment, desiring discord among the Muslims and seeking to divide them. 
They compounded their error, sowing discord between the inhabitants of India and the 
other Muslims. They wrote a number of books in opposition to the Islamic caliphate. 
Those materialists are not like the materialists of Europe; for whoever abandons 
religion in Western countries retains love for his country, and his zeal to guard his 
country from the attacks of foreigners is not diminished. He gives freely of his most 
precious possessions for its advancement, and will sacrifice his life for its sake. But 
Ahmad Khan and his companions, just as they invited people to reject religion, [also] 
disparaged to them the interests of their fatherland, and made people consider foreign 
domination over them a slight thing, and strove to erase the traces of religious and 
patriotic zeal. They breached those national resources that perhaps the English had 
neglected to plunder, in order to call the government's attention to them, so that they 
should not be neglected. They did this not for a considerable reward or an exalted 
honor, but for a vile piece of bread, a paltry gain. (Thus the Oriental materialist is 
distinguished from the Western materialist by baseness and vileness, in addition to 
unbelief and impiety.)  
The English did well by Ahmad Khan, by appointing his son Maulavi Mahmud 
member of the council of an Indian village no larger than Shubrakhit in the Buhaira 
region [in Egypt].  
One of the snares for the hunting of weak Muslims was to promise and raise 
their hopes that if they followed him he would bring them into government service, 
thanks to his position with the English tyranny. But the English government named only 
four of his companions to village councils, and no native Indian is found in such 
positions except they. This is the glory bestowed on Ahmad Khan as the price for his 
religion and fatherland. As Siddiq Nawwab Hasan Khan, King of Bhopal and the author 
of famous works, has said: "Ahmad Khan is the arch Deceiver of the Day of Judgment."  
The English authorities helped him to employ some to whom they gave 
preference, but not in the British Indian Government nor in the English Treasury. 
Rather, the ruler obliged one of the princes remaining in formal independence to 
employ them in certain inferior functions.  
[Ahmad Khan's] doctrine was pleasing to the eyes of the English rulers and they 
were delighted with it. They considered it a means to their goal of obliterating the 
Islamic religion in Indian territories.  
These materialists became an army for the English government in India. They 
drew their swords to cut the throats of the Muslims, while weeping for them and crying, 
"We kill you only out of compassion and pity for you, and seeking to improve you and 
make your lives comfortable." The English saw that this was the most likely means to 
attain their goal: the weakness of Islam and the Muslims.  
The most faithful disciple of Ahmad Khan, his chief assistant and administrator 
in all his affairs, is a man named Sami'allah Khan. Sami'allah Khan is the cleverest and 
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most diligent of the materialists in misleading the Muslims, the subtlest in tricks, and 
the most cunning in creating means to split the unity of the believers and to strengthen 
the English government in India. This swindler sets himself up as a preacher at Muslim 
gatherings, and his tears precede his words. He brings forth the utmost of his eloquence 
in order to destroy the pillars of the Islamic religion and nullify its fundamental beliefs. 
He even turns on the divine presence, and finds fault with the prophetic mission and its 
bearer, all this while he weeps, as if he were mourning the religion and its adherents.  
When he enters a land in order to carry out this service, he continues for days to 
enter the mosques and attend religious gatherings; to entice people with agreeable 
words and charming promises; and to attract them to him without their knowing it. 
When some of the people assemble around him, blinded by his pleasing exterior, he 
proceeds to call them to his turbid doctrine of the abandonment of religion.  
For these efforts, this evident enemy of Islam and the Muslims has already been 
given the post of judge (in the English law) in the town of Agra, a town no bigger than 
Dasuq in the Gharbiyya province [in Egypt]. The newspaper, The Times, after highly 
praising Sami'allah Khan, said that this post, a judgeship in a small town, was the 
highest post conferred on a native Indian. (Is there any need, in order to demonstrate 
English justice, for more evidence than this?) Northbrook, the English lord, one part of 
whose history in India we referred to in the last issue, fully recognized Sami'allah Khan 
as soon as he became the ruler in India, and he understood that he was the more faithful 
of men in service to the English, and the most capable of serving them. Therefore, that 
lord asked him to be private secretary in Egypt, in order to use him to alienate the 
Egyptians from the Ottoman Government; to persuade the Egyptians that the 
government of England wished them well; and to employ him to win over the hearts of 
the ulema, since he was one of them (according to his claim). Perhaps he intends to 
enter the mosques and to preach and give sermons, and to relate regarding English 
justice what has no truth and what is belied by reality. However, we have hope, because 
of the intelligence of the Egyptians, the correctness of their religious beliefs, and the 
strength of their ties to the Ottoman Government, that this Indian Rakis will not deceive 
them. (Rakis in the Sanscrit language is the Devil's disciple. May God not grant success 
to his goals, and may he not bestow on him his desires!) 
______________________________________ 
i. See Al-Afghani. 1884. The Materialist in India.  al-‘Urwa al-Wuthqa. August,28,1884. In 
Keddie,R.Nikki. 1968. An Islamic Response to Imperialisme,Political and Religious Writings of 
Sayyid Jamal ad-Din "Al-Afghani". Translated by Nikki R. Keddie and Hamid Algar. 
Berkeley:University of California Press.   Pp. 175-8. 
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Appendix 2: Lecture on Teaching and Learning 
On Thursday,November 8,1882,in Albert Hall,Calcutta,he said: 
I am very surprised at this principal’s unexpectedly breaking his promise.He is a teacher 
of philosophy,and philosophy is a motive for truthfulness and the improvement of 
manners,and a cause the civilization of the world.Thus,someone who is  a teacher of 
philosophy must observe all the rules of the human sphere,and not commit acts that are 
contrary to the laws of humanity.Truly,this principal’s breaking of his word is contrary 
to human honor and inconsistent with the dignity of science and philosophy. 
 
 Allow me to express my pleasure that so many Indian youths are here,all 
adorned with virtue and attainments,and all making great efforts to acquire 
knowledge.Certainly I must be happy to see such offspring of India,since they are the 
offshoots of that India that was the cradle of humanity.Human values spread out from 
India to the whole world.These youths are from the very land where the meridian circle 
was first determines.They are from the same realm that first understood the 
zodiac.Everyone knows that the determination of these two circles is impossible until 
perfection in geometry is achieved.Thus we can say that the Indians were the inventors 
of arithmetic and geometry.Note how Indian numerals were transferred from here to the 
Arabs,and from there to Europe. 
 
 These youths are also the sons of a land that was the source of all the laws and 
rules of the world.If one observes closely,he will see that the “Code Romain,” the 
mother of all Western codes,was taken from the four vedas and the shastras.The Greeks 
were the pupils of the Indians in literary ideas,limpid poetry,and lofty thoughts.One of 
these pupils,Pythagoras,spread sciences and wisdom in Greece and reached such a 
height that his word was accepted without proof as an inspiration from heaven. 
 
 (The Indians) reached the highest level in philosophic thought.The soil of India 
is the sqame soil; the air of India is the same air;and these youths who are present here 
are fruits of the same earth and climate.Soa I am very happy that they,having awakened 
after a long sleep,are reclaiming their inheritance and gathering the fruits of their own 
tree. 
 
 Now I would like to speak of science,teaching,and learning.How difficult it is to 
speak about science.These is no end or limit to science.The benefits of science are 
immeasurable;and these finite thoughts cannot encompass what is 
infinite.Besidews,thousands of eloquent speakers and sages have already expressed 
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their thoughts to explain science and its nobility.Despite this,nature does not permit me 
not to explain its virtues. 
 
 Thus I say:If someone looks deeply into the question,he will see that science 
rules the world.There was,is,and will be no ruler in the world but science.If we look at 
the Chaldean conquerrors,like Semiramis,who reached the borders of Tatary and 
India,the true conquerors were not tha Chaldeans but science and knowledge. 
 
 The Egyptians who increased thei realm,and Ramses II,called Sosestris,who 
reached Mesopotamia according to some and India accoreding to others-it was not the 
Egyptians but science that did it.The Phoenicians who,with their ships,gradually made 
colonies of the British Isles,Spain,Portugal,and Greece-in reality it was science,not the 
Phoenicians,which so expanded their power.Alexander never came to India or 
conquered the Indians; rather what conquered the Indians was science. 
 
 The Europeans have now put their hands on every part of the world.The English 
have reached Afghanistan;the French have seized Tunisia.In reality this 
usurpation,aggression,and conquest has not come from the French or the English.Rather 
it is science that everywhere manifests its greatness and power.Ignorance had no 
alternative to prostrating itself humbly before science and acknowledging its 
submission. 
 
 In reality,sovereignty has never left the abode of science.However,this true 
ruler,which is science,is continually changing capitals.Sometimes it has moved from 
East to West,and other times from West to East.More than this,if we study the riches of 
the world we learn that wealth is the result of commerce,industry,and 
agriculture.Agriculture is achievedonly with agricultural science,botanical 
chemistry,and geometry.Industry is produced only with 
physics,chemistry,mechanics,geometry,and mathematics; and commerce is based on 
agriculture and industry. 
 
 Thus it is evident that all wealth and riches are the result of science.There are no 
riches in the world without science,and there is no wealth in the world other than 
science.In sum,the whole world of humanity is an industry world,meaning that the 
world is a world of science.If science were removed from the human sphere,no man 
would continue to remain in the world. 
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 Since it is thus,science makes one man have the strength of ten,one hundred,one 
thousand,and ten thousand persons.The acquisitions of men for themselves and their 
governments are proportional to their science.Thus,every government for its own 
benefit must strive to lay the foundation of the sciences and to disseminate 
knowledge.Just as an individual who has an orchard must,for his own profit,work to 
level the ground and improve its treesand plants according to the laws of agronomy,just 
so rulers,for their own benefit,must strive for the dissemination of the sciences.Just as,if 
the owner of an orchard neglects to tend it according to the laws of agronomy,the loss 
will revert to him,so,if a ruler neglects the dissemination of the sciences among his 
subjects,the harm will revert to that government.What advantage is there to a Zulu king 
from ruling a society poor and barefoot,and how can one call such a government a 
government? 
 
 As the nobility of science has been somewhat clarified,we now wish to say some 
words about the relations between science,teaching,and learning.You must know that 
each science has a special subject and deals with nothing but the necessities and 
accidents of that special subject.For example,physics treats the special featuresof bodies 
that exist in the external world,and with its own special qualities,and does not enter into 
other matters that are necessary to the human world.Kimiya,or chemistry speaks of the 
special features of bodies with regard to analysis and composition.Plant scienceor 
botany fixes only plants as the subject of its discussion.Arithmetic deals with separate 
quantities and geometry with interconnected quantities,and similarly the other 
sciences.None of these sciences deals with matters outside its own subject. 
 
 If we observe well,we will learn that each one of these sciences whose subject is 
a special matter is like a limb of the body of science.Not one of them can maintain its 
existenceindividually and separately,or be the cause of benefit for the human 
world.For,the existence of each one ofthese sciences is related to another science,like 
the relation of arithmetic to geometry. 
 
 These need of one to for other sciences cannot be understood from the one 
science itself.Thus it is that if that science were isolated ,progress would not be 
achieved init,nor would it remainstable.Thus a science is needed to be the 
comprehensive soul for all the sciences,so that it can preserve their existence,apply each 
ofthem in its proper place,and become the cause of the progress ofeach of those 
sciences. 
 
 The science that has the position of a comprehensive soul and the rank of 
preserving force is the science of falsafa or philosophy,because its subject is universal.It 
is philosophy that shows man human prerequisites.It shows the sciences what is 
necessary.It employs each of thye sciences in in its proper place. 
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 If a community did not have philosophy,and all the individuals of that 
community  were learned in the sciences with particular subjects,those sciences could 
not last in that communityfor a century,that is,a hundred years.That community without 
the spirit of philosophy could not deduce conclusions from these sciences. 
 
 The Ottoman Government and the Khedivate of Egypt have been opening 
schools for the teaching of the new sciences for a period of sixty years,and until now 
they have not received any benefit from those sciences.The reason is that teaching the 
philosophical sciences was impossible in those schools,and because of the nonexistence 
of philosophy,no fruit was obtained from those sciences that are like 
limbs.Undoubtedly,if the spirit of philosophy had been in those schools,during this 
period of sixty years they themselves,independent of the European countries,would 
have striven to reform their kingdoms in accord with science.Also,they would not send 
their sons each year to European countries for education,and they would not invite 
teachers from there to their schools.I may say that if the spirit of philosophy were found 
in a community,even if that community did not have one of those sciences whose 
subject i8s particular,undoubtedly thei philosophic spirit would call for the acquisition 
of all the sciences. 
 
 The first Muslims had no science,but,thanks to the Islamic religion,a philosophic 
spirit arose among them,and owing to that philosophic spirit they began to discuss the 
general affairs of the world and human necessities.This was why they acquired in a 
short time all the sciences with particular subjects that they translated from the 
Syriac,Persian,and Greek into the Arabic language at the time of Mansur Davanaqi. 
 
 It is philosophy that makes man understandable to man,explains human 
nobility,and shows man the proper road.The first defect appearing in any nation that is 
headed toward decline is in the philosophic spirit.After that deficiencies spread into the 
other sciences,arts,and associations. 
 
 As the relationship between the preeminence of philosophy and the sciences has 
been explained,we now wish to say something about the quality of teaching and 
learning among the Muslims.Thus,I say that the Muslims these days do not see any 
benefit from their education.For example,they study grammar,and the purpose of 
grammar is that someone who has acquired the Arabic language be capable of speaking 
and writing.The Muslims now make grammar a goal in itself.For long years they 
expend philosophic thought on grammar to no avail,and after finishing they are unable 
to speak,write,or understand Arabic. 
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 Rhetoric,which they call literature,is the science that enables a man to become a 
writer,speaker,and poet.However,we see these days that after studying that science they 
are incapable of correcting their everyday speech. 
 
 Logic,which is the balance for ideas,should make everyone who acquires it 
capable of distinguishinfg every truth from falsehood and every right from 
wrong.However,we see that the minds of our Muslim logicians are full of every 
superstition and vanity,and no difference exists between their ideas and the ideas of the 
masses of the bazaar. 
 
Philosophy is the science that deals with the state of external beings,and their 
causes,reasons,needs,and requisites.It is strange that our ulama read Sadra and Shams 
al-bari’a and vaingloriously call themselves sages,and despite this they cannot 
distinguish their left hand from their right hand,and they do not ask: Who are we and 
what is right and proper for us? They never ask the causes of electricity,the 
steamboat,and railroads. 
 
Even stranger ,from early evening until morning they study the Shams al-bari’a 
with a lamp placed before them,and they do not once consider why if we remove its 
glass cover,much smoke comes out of it,and when we leave the glass,there is no 
smoke.Shame on such a philosopher ,and shame on such philosophy! A philosopher is 
someone whose mind is stimulated by all the events and parts of the world,not one who 
travels along a road like a blind man who does not know where its beginning and end 
are. 
 
Jurisprudence among the Muslims includes all domestic,municipal,and state 
laws.Thus a person who has studied jurisprudence profoundly is worthy of being prime 
minister of the realm or chief ambassador of the state,whereas we see our jurisconsults 
after  studying this science unable nto manage their own households,although they are 
proud of their own foolishness. 
 
The science of principles consists of the philosophy of the shari’a,or philosophy 
of law.In it are explained the truth regarding right and wrong,benefit and loss,and the 
causes for the promulgation of laws.Certainly,a person who studied this science should 
be capable of establishing laws and enforcing civilization.However,we see that those 
who study this science among the Muslims are deprived of understanding of the 
benefits of laws,the rules of civilization,and the reform of the world. 
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Since the state of these ulama has been demonstrated,we can say  that our ulama 
at this time are like a very narrow wick on top of which is a very small flame that 
neither lights its surroundings nor gives light to others.A scholar is a true light if he is a 
scholar.Thus,if a scholar is a scholar he must shed light on the whole world,and if his 
light does not reach the whole world,at least it should light up his region,his city,his 
village,or his home.What kind of scholar is it who does not enlighten even his own 
home? 
 
The strangest thing of all is that our ulama these days have divided science into 
two parts.One they call Muslim science,and one European science.Because of this they 
forbid others to teach some of the useful sciences.They have not understood that science 
is that noble thing that has no connection with any nation,and is not distinguished by 
anything but itself.Rather,everything that is known is known by science,and every 
nation that becomes renowned becomes renowned through science.Men must be related 
to science,not science to men. 
 
How very strange it is that the Muslims study those sciences that are ascribed to 
Aristotle with the greatest delight,as if Aristotle were one of the pillarsn of the 
Muslims.However,if the discussion relates to Galileo,Newton,and Kepler,they consider 
them infidels.The father and mother of science is proof,and proof is neither Aristotle 
nor Galileo.The truth is where there is proof,and those who forbid science and 
knowledge in the belief that they are safeguarding the Islamic religion aqre really the 
enemies of that religion.The Islamic religion is the closest of religions to science and 
knowledge,and there is no incompatibility between science and knowledge and the 
foundation of the Islamic faith. 
 
As for Ghazali,who was called the Proof of Islam,in the book Deliverence from 
Error he says that someone who claims that the Islamic religion is incompatible with 
geometric proofs,philosophical demonstrations,and the laws of nature is an ignorant 
friend of Islam.The harm of this ignorant friend to Islam is greater than the harm of the 
heretics and enemies of Islam.For the laws of nature.geometric proofs,and philosophic 
demonstrations are self-evident truths.Thus,someone who says.”My religion is 
inconsistent with self-evident truths,” has inevitably passed judgement on the falsify of 
his religion. 
 
The first education obtained by man was religious education,since philosophical 
education can only be obtained by a society that has studied some science and is able to 
understand proofs and demonstrations.Hence we can say that reformwill never be 
achieved by the Muslims except if the leaders of our religion first reform themselves 
and gather the fruits of their science and knowledge. 
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If one considers,he will understand this truth,that the ruin and corruption we 
have experienced first reached our ulama andreligious leaders,and then penetrated the 
rest of the community. 
 
I now wish to excuse myself,since,contrary to his promise,the principal caused 
this talk to be delivered only in an abbreviated form. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_________________________________________ 
ii. See Al-Afghani.  1882. Lecture on Teaching and Learning. On Thursday,November,1882,in 
Albert Hall,Calcutta,India.  In Keddie,R.Nikki.  1968.  An Islamic Response to 
Imperialisme,Political and Religious Writings of Sayyid Jamal ad-Din "Al-Afghani".  
Berkeley:University of California Press. Pp. 101-108.This article spoken and written in English 
in the original.  
See also Kurzman,Charles. 2002.  Modernist Islam,1840-1940 A Source-Book.  New 
York:Oxford University Press.  Pp.103-107. 
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Appendix 3: Answer of Jamal al-Din to Renan, Journal des Débats, 18 May 1883 
 
Sir, 
I have read in your estimable journal of last 29 March, a talk on Islam and Science, 
given in the Sorbonne before a distinguished audience by the great thinker of our time, 
the illustrious M. Renan, whose renown has filled the West and penetrated into the 
farthest countries of the East. Since this speech suggested to me some observations, I 
took the liberty of formulating them in this letter, which I have the honor of addressing 
to you with a request that you accommodate it in your columns. 
 
M. Renan wanted to clarify a point of the history of the Arabs which had remained 
unclear until now and to throw a light on their past, a light that may be somewhat 
troubling for those who venerate these people, though one cannot say that he has 
usurped the place and rank that they formerly occupied in the world. M. Renan has not 
at all tried, we believe, to destroy the glory of the Arabs which is indestructible; he has 
applied himself to discovering historical truth and making it known to those who do not 
know it, as well as to those who study the influence of religions in the history of 
nations, and in particular in that of civilization. I hasten to recognize that M. Renan has 
acquitted himself marvelously of this very difficult task, in citing certain facts that have 
passed unnoticed until this time. I find in his talk remarkable observations, new 
perceptions, and an indescribable charm. However, I have under my eyes only a more 
or less faithful translation of this talk. If I had had the opportunity to read it in the 
French text, I could have penetrated better the ideas of this great thinker. He receives 
my humble salutation as an homage that is due him and as the sincere expression of my 
admiration. I would say to him, finally, in these circumstances, what Al-Mutanabbi, a 
poet who loved philosophy wrote several centuries ago to a high personage whose 
actions he celebrated: "Receive," he said to him, "the praises that I can give you; do not 
force me to bestow on you the praises that you merit."  
 
M. Renan's talk covered two principle points. The eminent philosopher applied himself 
to proving that the Muslim religion was by its very essence opposed to the development 
of science, and that the Arab people, by their nature, do not like either metaphysical 
sciences or philosophy. This precious plant, M. Renan seems to say, dried up in their 
hands as if burnt up by the breath of the desert wind. But, after reading this talk one 
cannot refrain from asking oneself if these obstacles come uniquely from the Muslim 
religion itself or from the manner in which it was propagated in the world; from the 
character, manners, and aptitudes of the peoples who adopted this religion, or of those 
on whose nations it was imposed by force. It is no doubt the lack of time that kept M. 
Renan from elucidating these points; but the harm is no less for that, and if it is difficult 
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to determine its causes in a precise manner and by irrefutable proof, it is even more 
difficult to indicate the remedy.  
 
As to the first point, I will say that no nation at its origin is capable of letting itself be 
guided by pure reason. Haunted by terrors that it cannot escape, it is incapable of 
distinguishing good from evil, of distinguishing that which could make it happy from 
that which might be the unfailing source of its unhappiness and misfortune. It does not 
know, in a word, either how to trace back causes or how to discern effects.  
 
This lacuna means that it cannot be led either by force or persuasion to practice the 
actions that would perhaps be the most profitable for it, or to avoid what is harmful. It 
was therefore necessary that humanity looked outside itself for a place of refuge, a 
peaceful corner where its tormented conscience could find repose. It was then that there 
arose some educator or other who, not having, as I said above, the necessary power to 
force humanity to follow the inspiration of reason, hurled it into the unknown and 
opened it to vast horizons where the imagination was pleased and where it found if not 
the complete satisfaction of its desires, at least an unlimited field for its hopes. And, 
since humanity, at its origin, did not know the causes of the events that passed under its 
eyes and the secrets of things, it was perforce led to follow the advice of its teachers and 
the orders they gave. This obedience was imposed in the name of the Supreme Being to 
whom the educators attributed all events, without permitting men to discuss its utility of 
its disadvantages. No doubt, for man this is one of the heaviest and most humiliating 
yokes, as I recognize; but one cannot deny that itnis by this religious education, whether 
it be Muslim, Christian, or pagan, that all nations have emerged from barbarism and 
marched toward a more advanced civilization. 
 
 If it is true that the Muslim religion is an obstacle to the development of sciences, can 
one affirm that this obstacle will not disappear someday? How does the Muslim religion 
differ on this point from other religions? All religions are intolerant, each one in its 
way. The Christian religion, I mean the society that follows its inspirations and its 
teachings and is formed in its image, has emerged from the first period to which I have 
just alluded; thenceforth free and independent, it seems to advance rapidly on the road 
of progress and science, whereas Muslim society has not yet freed itself from the 
tutelage of religion. Realizing, however, that the Christian religion preceded the Muslim 
religion in the world by many centuries, I cannot keep from hoping that Mohammadan 
society will succeed in breaking its bonds and marching resolutely in the path of 
civilization someday after the manner of Western society, for which the Christian faith, 
despite its rigors and intolerance, was not at all an invincible obstacle. No, I cannot 
admit that this hope be denied to Islam. I plead here with M. Renan not the cause of the 
Muslim religion, but that of several hundreds of millions of men, who would thus be 
condemned to live in barbarism and ignorance.  
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In truth, the Muslim religion has tried to stifle science and stop its progress. It has thus 
succeeded in halting the philosophical or intellectual movement and in turning minds 
from the search for scientific truth. A similar attempt, if I am not mistaken, was made 
by the Christian religion, and the venerated leaders of the Catholic Church have not yet 
disarmed, so far as I know. They continue to fight energetically against what they call 
the spirit of vertigo and error. I know all the difficulties that the Muslims will have to 
surmount to achieve the same degree of civilization, access to truth with the help of 
philosophic and scientific methods being forbidden them. A true believer must, in fact, 
turn from the path of studies that have for their object scientific truth, studies on which 
all truth must depend, according to an opinion accepted at least by some people in 
Europe. Yoked, like an ox to the plow, to the dogma whose slave he is, he must walk 
eternally in the furrow that has been traced for him in advance by the interpreters of the 
law. Convinced, besides, that his religion contains in itself all morality and all science, 
he attaches himself resolutely to it and makes no effort to go beyond. Why should he 
exhaust himself in vain attempts? What would be the benefit of seeking truth when he 
believes he possesses it all? Will he be happier on the day when he has lost his faith, the 
day when he has stopped believing that all perfections are in the religion he practices 
and not in another? Wherefore he despises science. I know all this, but I know equally 
that this Muslim and Arab child whose portrait M. Renan traces in such vigorous terms 
and who, at a later age, becomes "a fanatic, full of foolish pride in possessing what he 
believes to be absolute truth," belongs to a race that has marked its passage in the world, 
not only by fire and blood, but by brilliant and fruitful achievements that prove its taste 
for science, for all the sciences, including philosophy (with which, I must recognize, it 
was unable to live,happily for long).  
 
I am led here to speak of the second point that M. Renan treated in his lecture with an 
incontestable authority. No one denies that the Arab people, while still in the state of 
barbarism, rushed along the road of intellectual and scientific progress with a rapidity 
only equaled by the speed of its conquests, since in the space of a century, it acquired 
and assimilated almost all of the Greek and Persian sciences that had developed slowly 
during several centuries on their native soil, just as it extended its domination from the 
Arabian peninsula up to the mountains of the Himalayas and the summit of the 
Pyrénées. One might say that during this entire period, the sciences made astonishing 
progress among the Arabs and in all the countries under their domination. Rome and 
Byzantium were then the seats of theological and philosophical sciences, as well as the 
shining center and burning hearth of all human knowledge. Having followed for several 
centuries the path of civilization, the Greeks and Romans walked with assurance over 
the vast field of science and philosophy. There came, however, a time when their 
researches were abandoned and their studies interrupted.  
The monuments they had built to science collapsed and their most precious books were 
relegated to oblivion. The Arabs, ignorant and barbaric as they were in origin, took up 
what had been abandoned by the civilized nations, rekindled the extinguished sciences, 
developed them and gave them a brilliance they had never had. Is not this the index and 
proof of their natural love for sciences? It is true that the Arabs took from the Greeks 
their philosophy as they stripped the Persians of what made their fame in antiquity; but 
these sciences, which they usurped by right of conquest, they developed, extended, 
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clarified, perfected, completed, and coordinated mwith a perfect taste and a rare 
precision and exactitude. Besides, the French, the Germans, and the English were not so 
far from Rome and Byzantium as were the Arabs, whose capital was Baghdad. It was 
therefore easier for the former to exploit the scientific treasures that were buried in these 
two great cities. They made no effort in this direction until Arab civilization lit up with 
its reflections the summits of the Pyrénées and poured its light and riches on the 
Occident. The Europeans welcomed Aristotle, who had emigrated and become Arab; 
but they did not think of him at all when he was Greek and their neighbor. Is there not 
in this another proof, no less evident, of the intellectual superiority of the Arabs and of 
their natural attachment to philosophy? It is true that after the fall of the Arab kingdom 
in the Orient as in the Occident, the countries that had become great centers of science, 
like Iraq and Andalusia, fell again into ignorance and became the centers of religious 
fanaticism; but one cannot conclude from this sad spectacle that the scientific and 
philosophic progress of the Middle Ages was not due to the Arab people who ruled at 
that time. 
 
M. Renan does do them this justice. He recognizes that the Arabs conserved and 
maintained for centuries the hearth of science. What nobler mission for a people! But 
while recognizing that from about 775 C.E. to near the middle of the thirteenth century, 
that is to say during about 500 years, there were in Muslim countries very distinguished 
scholars and thinkers, and that during this period the Muslim world was superior in 
intellectual culture to the Christian world, M. Renan has said that the philosophers of 
the first centuries of Islam as well as the statesmen who became famous in this period 
were mostly from Harran, from Andalusia, and from Iran. There were also among them 
Transoxianian and Syrian priests. I do not wish to deny the great qualities of the Persian 
scholars nor the role that they played in the Arab world; but permit me to say that the 
Harranians were Arabs and that the Arabs in occupying Spain and Andalusia did not 
lose their nationality; they remained Arabs. Several centuries before Islam, the Arabic 
language was that of the Harranians. The fact that they preserved their former religion, 
Sabaeanism, does not mean they should be considered foreign to the Arab nationality. 
The Syrian priests were also for the most part Ghassanian Arabs converted to 
Christianity.  
 
As for Ibn-Bajja, Ibn-Rushd (Averroes), and Ibn-Tufail, one cannot say that they are not 
just as Arab as Al-Kindi because they were not born in Arabia, especially if one is 
willing to consider that human races are only distinguished by their languages and that 
if this distinction should disappear, nations would not take long to forget their diverse 
origins. The Arabs who put their arms in the service of the Muslim religion, and who 
were simultaneously warriors and apostles, did not impose their language on the 
defeated, and wherever they established themselves, they preserved it for them with a 
jealous care. No doubt Islam, in penetrating the conquered countries with the violence 
that is known, transplanted there its language, its manners, and its doctrine, and these 
countries could not thenceforth avoid its influence. Iran is an example; but it is possible 
that in going back to the centuries preceding the appearance of Islam, one would find 
that the Arabic language was not then entirely unknown to Persian scholars. The 
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expansion of Islam gave it, it is true, a new scope, and the Persian scholars converted to 
the Mohammadan faith thought it an honor to write their books in the language of the 
Qur'an. The Arabs cannot, no doubt, claim for themselves the glory that renders these 
writers illustrious, but we believe that they do not need this claim; they have among 
themselves enough celebrated scholars and writers. What would happen if, going back 
to the first period of Arab domination, we followed step by step the first group from 
which was formed this conquering people who spread their power over the world, and 
if, eliminating everything that is outside this group and its descendants, we did not take 
into account either the influence it exercised on minds or the impulse it gave to the 
sciences? Would we not be led, thus, no longer to recognize in conquering peoples other 
virtues or merits than those that flow from the material fact of conquest? All conquered 
peoples would then regain their moral autonomy and would attribute to themselves all 
glory, no part of which could be claimed legitimately by the power that fructified and 
developed these germs. Thus, Italy would come to say to France that neither Mazarin 
nor Bonaparte belonged to her; Germany or England would in turn claim the scholars 
who, having come to France, made its professorships illustrious and enhanced the 
brilliance of its scientific renown. The French, on their side, would claim for themselves 
the glory of the offspring of those illustrious families who, after [the revocation of] the 
edict of Nantes, immigrated to all Europe. And if all Europeans belong to the same 
stock, one can with justice claim that the Harranians and the Syrians, who are Semites, 
belong equally to the great Arab family.  
 
It is permissible, however, to ask oneself why Arab civilization, after having thrown 
such a live light on the world, suddenly became extinguished; why this torch has not 
been relit since; and why the Arab world still remains buried in profound darkness. 
Here the responsibility of the Muslim religion appears complete. It is clear that 
wherever it became established, this religion tried to stifle the sciences and it was 
marvelously served in its designs by despotism. 
  
Al-Siuti tells that the Caliph al-Hadi put to death in Baghdad 5,000 philosophers in 
order to destroy sciences in the Muslim countries down to their roots. Admitting that 
this historian exaggerated the number of victims, nonetheless it remains established that 
this persecution took place, and it is a bloody stain for the history of a religion as it is 
for the history of a people. I could find in the past of the Christian religion analogous 
facts. Religions, by whatever names they are called, all resemble each other. No 
agreement and no reconciliation are possible between these religions and philosophy. 
Religion imposes on man its faith and its belief, whereas philosophy frees him of it 
totally or in part. How could one therefore hope that they would agree with each other 
when the Christian religion, under the most modest and seductive forms, entered Athens 
and Alexandria, which were, as everyone knows, the two principal centers of science 
and philosophy, trying to stifle both under the bushes of theological discussions, to 
explain the inexplicable mysteries of the Trinity, the Incarnation, and 
Transubstantiation? It will always be thus. Whenever religion will have the upper hand, 
it will eliminate philosophy; and the contrary occurs when it is philosophy that reigns as 
17 
 
sovereign mistress. So long as humanity exists, the struggle will not cease between 
dogma and free investigation, between religion and philosophy; a desperate struggle in 
which, I fear, the triumph will not be for free thought, because the masses dislike 
reason, and its teachings are only understood by some intelligent members of the élite, 
and because, also, science, however beautiful it is, does not completely satisfy 
humanity, which thirsts for the ideal and which likes to exist in such dark and distant 
regions as the philosophers and scholars can neither perceive nor explore.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
______________________________________________ 
iii. See Al-Afghani. 1883. Answer of Jamal ad-Din to Renan. Journal Des Debats,May 18,1883. In 
An Islamic Response to Imperialism.  Translated by Nikki R. Keddie Berkeley:University of 
California Press. Original French Source, 28 August 1884, reprinted Cairo 1958, and 'Exchange 
with Ernest Renan'. In Journal des Debats . (Paris), 18 May 1883 (written in Arabic and 
translated into French for publication).  Pp.181-87. 
See also Kurzman,Charles. ed.  2002.  Modernist Islam,1840-1940 A Source-Book. New 
York:Oxford University Press. Pp. 107-110. 
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Appendix 4: Ernest Renan in Orientalism by Edward W.Said 
Chapter 2 Orientalist Structures and Restructures 
II Silvestre de Sacy and Ernest Renan:Rational Anthropology and 
Philological Laboratory 
 
The two great themes of Silvestre de Sacy's life are heroic effort and a dedicated 
sense of pedagogic and rational utility.Born in 1757 into a Jansenist family whose 
occupation was traditionally that of notaire, Antoine Isaac--Silvestre was privately 
tutored at a Benedictine abbey, first in Arabic, Syriac, and Chaldean, then in Hebrew. 
Arabic in particular was the language that opened the Orient to him since it was in 
Arabic, according to Joseph Reinaud, that Oriental material, both sacred and profane, 
was then to be found in its oldest and most instructive form.11 Although a legitimist, in 
1769 he was appointed the first teacher of Arabic at the newly created school of langues 
orientales vivantes, of which he became director in 1824. In 1806 he was named 
professor at the College de France, although from 1805 on he was the resident 
Orientalist at the French Foreign Ministry. There his work (unpaid until 1811) at first 
was to translate the bulletins of the Grande Armee and Napoleon's Manifesto of 1806, 
in which it was hoped that "Muslim fanaticism" could be excited against Russian 
Orthodoxy. But for many years thereafter Sacy created interpreters for the French 
Oriental dragomanate, as well as future scholars. When the French occupied Algiers in 
1830, it was Sacy who translated the proclamation to the Algerians; he was regularly 
consulted on all diplomatic matters relating to the Orient by the foreign minister, and on 
occasion by the minister of war. At the age of seventy five he replaced Dacier as 
secretary of the Academie des Inscriptions, and also became curator of Oriental 
manuscripts at the Bibliotheque royale. Throughout his long and distinguished career 
his name was rightly associated with the restructuring and re forming of education 
(particularly in Oriental studies) in post Revolutionary France.12  With Cuvier, Sacy in 
1832 was made a new peer of France. 
 It was not only because he was the first president of the Societe asiatique 
(founded in 1822) that Sacy's name is associated with the beginning of modern 
Orientalism; it is because his work virtually put before the profession an entire 
systematic body of texts, a pedagogic practice, a scholarly tradition, and an important 
link between Oriental scholarship and public policy. In Sacy's work, for the first time in 
Europe since the Council of Vienne, there was a self conscious methodological 
principle at work as a coeval with scholarly discipline. No less important, Sacy always 
felt himself to be a man standing at the beginning of an important revisionist project. He 
was a self aware inaugurator, and more to the point of our general thesis, he acted in his 
writing like a secularized ecclesiastic for whom his Orient and his students were 
doctrine and parishioners respectively. The Duc de Broglie, an admiring contemporary, 
said of Sacy's work that it reconciled the manner of a scientist with that of a Biblical 
teacher, and that Sacy was the one man able to reconcile "the goals of Leibniz with the 
efforts of Bossuet."13 Consequently everything he wrote was addressed specifically to 
students (in the case of his first work, his Principes de grammaire générale of 1799, the 
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student was his own son) and presented, not as a novelty, but as a revised extract of the 
best that had already been done, said, or written. 
These two characteristics the didactic presentation to students and the avowed 
intention of repeating by revision and extract are crucial. Sacy's writing always conveys 
the tone of a voice speaking; his prose is dotted with first person pronouns, with 
personal qualifications, with rhetorical presence. Even at his most recondite as in a 
scholarly note on third century Sassanid numismatics one senses not so much a pen 
writing as a voice pronouncing. The keynote of his work is contained in the opening 
lines of the dedication to his son of the Principes de grammaire générale: "C'est à toi, 
mon cher Fils, que ce petit ouvrage a été entrepris" which is to say, I am writing (or 
speaking) to you because you need to know these things, and since they don't exist in 
any serviceable form, I have done the work myself for you. Direct address: utility: 
effort: immediate and beneficent rationality. For Sacy believed that everything could be 
made clear and reasonable, no matter how difficult the task and how obscure the 
subject. Here are Bossuet's sternness and Leibniz's abstract humanism, as well as the 
tone of Rousseau, all together in the same style. 
The effect of Sacy's tone is to form a circle sealing off him and his audience 
from the world at large, the way a teacher and his pupils together in a closed classroom 
also form a sealed space. Unlike the matter of physics, philosophy, or classical 
literature, the matter of Oriental studies is arcane; it is of import to people who already 
have an interest in the Orient but want to know the Orient better, in a more orderly way, 
and here the pedagogical discipline is more effective than it is attractive. The didactic 
speaker, therefore, displays his material to the disciples, whose role it is to receive what 
is given to them in the form of carefully selected and arranged topics. Since the Orient 
is old and distant, the teacher's display is a restoration, a re vision of what has 
disappeared from the wider ken. And since also the vastly rich (in space, time, and 
cultures) Orient cannot be totally exposed, only its most representative parts need be. 
Thus Sacy's focus is the anthology, the chrestomathy, the tableau, the survey of general 
principles, in which a relatively small set of powerful examples delivers the Orient to 
the student. Such examples are powerful for two reasons: one, because they reflect 
Sacy's powers as a Western authority deliberately taking from the Orient what its 
distance and eccentricity have hitherto kept hidden, and two, because these examples 
have the semiotical power in them (or imparted to them by the Orientalist) to signify the 
Orient. 
All of Sacy's work is essentially compilatory; it is thus ceremoniously didactic 
and painstakingly revisionist. Aside from the Principes de grammaire générale, he 
produced a Chrestomathie arabe in three volumes (1806 and 1827 ), an anthology of 
Arab grammatical writing (1825), an Arabic grammar of 1810 (d l'usage des élèves de 
l'Ecole spéciale), treatises on Arabic prosody and the Druze religion, and numerous 
short works on Oriental numismatics, onomastics, epigraphy, geography, history, and 
weights and measures. He did a fair number of translations and two extended 
commentaries on Calila and Dumna and the Maqamat of al Hariri. As editor, 
memorialist, and historian of modem learning Sacy was similarly energetic. There was 
very little of note in other related disciplines with which he was not au courant, 
although his own writing was single minded and, in its non¬-Orientalist respects, of a 
narrow positivist range. 
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 Yet when in 1802 the Institut de France was commissioned by Napoleon to form 
a tableau générale on the state and progress of the arts and sciences since 1789, Sacy 
was chosen to be one of the team of writers: he was the most rigorous of specialists and 
the most historical minded of generalists. Dacier's report, as it was known informally, 
embodied many of Sacy's predilections as well as containing his contributions on the 
state of Oriental learning. Its title  Tableau historique de l'érudition française announces 
the new historical (as opposed to sacred) consciousness. Such consciousness is 
dramatic: learning can be arranged on a stage set, as it were, where its totality can be 
readily surveyed. Addressed to the king, Dacier's preface stated the theme perfectly. 
Such a survey as this made it possible to do something no other sovereign had 
attempted, namely to take in, with one coup d'oeil, the whole of human knowledge. Had 
such a tableau historique been undertaken in former times, Dacier continued, we might 
today have possessed many masterpieces now either lost or destroyed; the interest and 
utility of the tableau were that it preserved knowledge and made it immediately 
accessible. Dacier intimated that such a task was simplified by Napoleon's Oriental 
expedition, one of whose results was to heighten the degree of modern geographical 
knowledge.14 (At no point more than in Dacier's entire discours do we see how the 
dramatic form of a tableau historique has its use equivalent in the arcades and counters 
of a modern department store.) 
The importance of the Tableau historique for an understanding of Orientalism's 
inaugural phase is that it exteriorizes the form of Orientalist knowledge. and its features, 
as it also describes the Orientalist's relationship to his subject matter. In Sacy's pages on 
Orientalism as elsewhere in his writing he speaks of his own work as having uncovered, 
brought to light, rescued a vast amount of obscure matter. Why? In order to place it 
before the student. For like all his learned contemporaries Sacy considered a learned 
work a positive addition to an edifice that all scholars erected to¬gether. Knowledge 
was essentially the making visible of material, and the aim of a tableau was the 
construction of a sort of Benthamite Panopticon. Scholarly discipline was therefore a 
specific technology of power: it gained for its user (and his students) tools and 
knowledge which (if he was a historian) had hitherto been lost.15 And indeed the 
vocabulary of specialized power and acquisi¬tion is particularly associated with Sacy's 
reputation as a pioneer Orientalist. His heroism as a scholar was to have dealt 
successfully with insurmountable difficulties; he acquired the means to present a field to 
his students where there was none. He made the books, the precepts, the examples, said 
the Duc de Broglie of Sacy. The result was the production of material about the Orient, 
methods for studying it, and exempla that even Orientals did not have.16 
Compared with the labors of a Hellenist or a Latinist working on the Institut 
team, Sacy's labors were awesome. They had the texts, the conventions, the schools; he 
did not, and consequently had to go about making them. The dynamic of primary loss 
and subsequent gain in Sacy's writing is obsessional; his investment in it was truly 
heavy. Like his colleagues in other fields he believed that knowledge is seeing pan 
optically, so to speak but unlike them he not only had to identify the knowledge, he had 
to decipher it, interpret it, and most difficult, make it available. Sacy's achieve¬ment 
was to have produced a whole field. As a European he ransacked the Oriental archives, 
and he could do so without leaving France. What texts he isolated, he then brought 
back; he doctored them; then he annotated, codified, arranged, and commented on them. 
In time, the Orient as such became less important than what the Orientalist made of it; 
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thus, drawn by Sacy into the sealed discursive place of a pedagogical tableau, the 
Orientalist's Orient was thereafter reluctant to emerge into reality. 
 Sacy was much too intelligent to let his views and his practice stand without 
supporting argument. First of all, he always made it plain why the "Orient" on its own 
could not survive a European's taste, intelligence, or patience. Sacy defended the utility 
and interest of such things as Arabic poetry, but what he was really saying was that 
Arabic poetry had to be properly transformed by the Orientalist before it could begin to 
be appreciated. The reasons were broadly epistemological, but they also contained an 
Orientalistic self justification. Arabic poetry was produced by a completely strange (to 
Europeans) people, under hugely different climatic, social, and historical conditions 
from those a European knows; in addition, such poetry as this was nourished by 
"opinions, prejudices, beliefs, superstitions which we can acquire only after long and 
painful study." Even if one does go through the rigors of specialized training, much of 
the description in the poetry will not be accessible to Europeans "who have attained to a 
higher degree of civilization." Yet what we can master is of great value to us as 
Europeans accustomed to disguise our exterior attributes, our bodily activity, and our 
relationship to nature. Therefore, the Orientalist's use is to make available to his 
compatriots a considerable range of unusual experience, and still more valuable, a kind 
of literature capable of helping us understand the "truly divine" poetry of the 
Hebrews.17 
So if the Orientalist is necessary because he fishes some useful gems out of the 
distant Oriental deep, and since the Orient cannot be known without his mediation, it is 
also true that Oriental writing itself ought not to be taken in whole. This is Sacy's 
introduction to his theory of fragments, a common Romantic concern. Not only are 
Oriental literary productions essentially alien to the European; they also do not contain 
a sustained enough interest, nor are they written with enough "taste and critical spirit," 
to merit publication except as extracts (pour meriter d'être publies autrement que par 
extrait).18 Therefore the Orientalist is required to present the Orient by a series of 
representative fragments, fragments republished, explicated, annotated, and surrounded 
with still more fragments. For such a presentation a special genre is required: the 
chrestomathy, which is where in Sacy's case the usefulness and interest of Orientalism 
are most directly and profitably displayed. Sacy's most famous production was the three 
volume Chrestomathie arabe, which was sealed at the outset, so to speak, with an 
internally rhyming Arabic couplet: "Kitab al anis al mufid lil Taleb al mustafid;/wa 
gam'i al shathur min manthoum wa manthur" (A book pleasant and profitable for the 
studious pupil;/it collects fragments of both poetry and prose). 
 Sacy's anthologies were used very widely in Europe for several generations. 
Although what they contain was claimed as typical, they submerge and cover the 
censorship of the Orient exercised by the Orientalist. Moreover, the internal order of 
their contents, the arrangement of their parts, the choice of fragments, never reveal their 
secret; one has the impression that if fragments were not chosen for their importance, or 
for their chronological development, or for their aesthetic beauty (as Sacy's were not), 
they must nevertheless embody a certain Oriental naturalness, or typical inevitability. 
But this too is never said. Sacy claims simply to have exerted himself on behalf of his 
students, to make it unnecessary for them to purchase (or read) a grotesquely large 
library of Oriental stuff. In time, the reader forgets the Orientalist's effort and takes the 
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restructuring of the Orient signified by a chrestomathy as the Orient tout court. 
Objective structure (designation of Orient) and subjective restructure (representation of 
Orient by Orientalist) become interchangeable. The Orient is overlaid with the 
Orientalist's rationality; its principles become his. From being distant, it becomes 
available; from being unsustainable on its own, it becomes pedagogically useful; from 
being lost, it is found, even if its missing parts have been made to drop away from it in 
the process. Sacy's anthologies not only supplement the Orient; they supply it as 
Oriental presence to the West.19 Sacy's work canonizes the Orient; it begets a canon of 
textual objects passed on from one generation of students to the next. 
And the living legacy of Sacy's disciples was astounding. Every major Arabist in 
Europe during the nineteenth century traced his intellectual authority back to him. 
Universities and academies in France, Spain, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, and 
especially Germany were dotted with the students who formed themselves at his feet 
and through the anthological tableaux provided by his work.20 As with all intellectual 
patrimonies, however, enrichments and restrictions were passed on simultaneously. 
Sacy's genealogical originality was to have treated the Orient as something to be 
restored not only because of but also despite the modern Orient's disorderly and elusive 
presence. Sacy placed the Arabs in the Orient, which was itself placed in the general 
tableau of modern learning. Orientalism belonged therefore to European scholarship, 
but its material had to be re created by the Orientalist before it could enter the arcades 
alongside Latinism and Hellenism. Each Orientalist re created his own Orient according 
to the fundamental epistemological rules of loss and gain first supplied and enacted by 
Sacy. Just as he was the father of Orientalism, he was also the discipline's first sacrifice, 
for in translating new texts, fragments, and extracts subsequent Orientalists entirely 
displaced Sacy's work by supplying their own restored Orient. Nevertheless the process 
he started would continue, as philology in particular developed systematic and 
institutional powers Sacy had never exploited. This was Renan's accomplish¬ment: to 
have associated the Orient with the most recent compara¬tive disciplines, of which 
philology was one of the most eminent. 
The difference between Sacy and Renan is the difference between inauguration 
and continuity. Sacy is the originator, whose work represents the field's emergence and 
its status as a nineteenth century discipline with roots in revolutionary Romanticism. 
Renan derives from Orientalism's second generation: it was his task to solidify the 
official discourse of Orientalism, to systematize its insights, and to establish its 
intellectual and worldly institutions. For Sacy, it was his personal efforts that launched 
and vitalized the field and its structures; for Renan, it was his adaptation of Orientalism 
to philology and both of them to the intellectual culture of his time that perpetuated the 
Orientalist structures intellectually and gave them greater visibility. 
Renan was a figure in his own right neither of total originality nor of absolute 
derivativeness. Therefore as a cultural force or as an important Orientalist he cannot be 
reduced simply to his personality nor to a set of schematic ideas in which he believed. 
Rather, Renan is best grasped as a dynamic force whose oppor¬tunities were already 
created for him by pioneers like Sacy, yet who brought their achievements into the 
culture as a kind of currency which he circulated and recirculated with (to force the 
image a little further) his own unmistakable re currency. Renan is a figure who must be 
grasped, in short, as a type of cultural and intellectual praxis, as a style for making 
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Orientalist statements within what Michel Foucault would call the archive of his 
time.21 What matters is not only the things that Renan said but also how he said them, 
what, given his background and training, he chose to use as his subject matter, what to 
combine with what, and so forth. Renan's relations with his Oriental subject matter, with 
his time and audience, even with his own work, can be described, then, without 
resorting to formulae that depend on an unexamined assumption of ontological stability 
(e.g., the Zeitgeist, the history of ideas, life-and times). Instead we are able to read 
Renan as a writer doing something describable, in a place defined temporally, spatially, 
and culturally (hence archivally), for an audience and, no less important, for the 
furtherance of his own position in the Orientalism of his era. 
Renan came to Orientalism from philology, and it is the extraordinarily rich and 
celebrated cultural position of that discipline that endowed Orientalism with its most 
important technical characteristics. For anyone to whom the word philology suggests 
dry as dust and inconsequential word study, however, Nietzsche's proclamation that 
along with the greatest minds of the nineteenth century he is a philologist will come as a 
surprise-though not if Balzac's Louis Lambert is recalled: 
What a marvelous book one would write by narrating the life and adventures of 
a word! Undoubtedly a word has received various impressions of the events for which it 
was used; depending on the places it was used, a word has awakened different kinds of 
impressions in different people; but is it not more grand still to consider a word in its 
triple aspect of soul, body, and movement?22 
What is the category, Nietzsche will ask later, that includes himself, Wagner, 
Schopenhauer, Leopardi, all as philologists? The term seems to include both a gift for 
exceptional spiritual insight into language and the ability to produce work whose 
articulation is of aesthetic and historical power.Although the profession of philology 
was born the day in 1777 "when F. A. Wolf invented for himself the name of stud. 
philol.," Nietzsche is nevertheless at pains to show that professional students of the 
Greek and Roman classics are commonly incapable of understanding their discipline: 
"they never reach the roots of the matter: they never adduce philology as a problem." 
For simply "as knowledge of the ancient world philology cannot, of course, last forever; 
its material is exhaustible."23 It is this that the herd of philologists cannot understand. 
But what distinguishes the few exceptional spirits whom Nietzsche deems worthy of 
praise not unambiguously, and not in the cursory way that I am now describing is their 
profound relation to modernity, a relation that is given them by their practice of 
philology. 
Philology problematizes itself,its practitioner, the present. It embodies a peculiar 
condition of being modern and European, since neither of those two categories has true 
meaning without being related to an earlier alien culture and time. What Nietzsche also 
sees is philology as something born, made in the Viconian sense as a sign of human 
enterprise, created as a category of human discovery, self discovery, and originality. 
Philology is a way of historically setting oneself off, as great artists do, from one's time 
and an immediate past even as, paradoxically and antinomically, one actually 
characterizes one's modernity by so doing. 
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Between the Friedrich August Wolf of 1777 and the Friedrich Nietzsche of 1875 
there is Ernest Renan, an Oriental philologist, also a man with a complex and interesting 
sense of the way philology and modern culture are involved in each other. In L'Avenir 
de la science (written in 1848 but not published till 1890) he wrote that "the founders of 
modern mind are philologists." And what is modern mind, he said in the preceding 
sentence, if not "rationalism, criticism, liberalism, [all of which] were founded on the 
same day as philology?" Philology, he goes on to say, is both a comparative discipline 
possessed only by moderns and a symbol of modern (and European) superiority; every 
advance made by humanity since the fifteenth century can b0 attributed to minds we 
should call philological. The job of philology in modern culture (a culture Renan calls 
philological) is to continue to see reality and nature clearly, thus driving out 
supernaturalism, and to continue to keep pace with discoveries in the physical sciences. 
But more than all this, philology enables a general view of human life and of the system 
of things: "Me, being there at the center, inhaling the perfume of everything, judging, 
comparing, combining, inducing in this way I shall arrive at the very system of things." 
There is an unmistakable aura of power about the philologist. And Renan makes his 
point about philology and the natural sciences:To do philosophy is to know things; 
following Cuvier's nice phrase, philosophy is instructing the world in theory. Like Kant 
I believe that every purely speculative demonstration has no more validity than a 
mathematical demonstration, and can teach us nothing about existing reality. Philology 
is the exact science of mental objects [La philologie est la science exacte des choses de 
l'esprit]. It is to the sciences of humanity what physics and chemistry are to the 
philosophic sciences of bodies.24 
I shall return to Renan's citation from Cuvier, as well as to the constant 
references to natural science, a little later. For the time being, we should remark that the 
whole middle section of L'Avenir de la science is taken up with Renan's admiring 
accounts of philology, a science he depicts as being at once the most difficult of all 
human endeavors to characterize and the most precise of all disciplines. In the 
aspirations of philology to a veritable science of humanity, Renan associates himself 
explicitly with Vico, Herder, Wolf, and Montesquieu as well as with such philological 
near- contemporaries as Wilhelm von Humboldt, Bopp, and the great Orientalist 
Eugene Burnouf (to whom the volume is dedicated). Renan locates philology centrally 
within what he everywhere refers to as the march of knowledge, and indeed the book 
itself is a manifesto of humanistic meliorism, which, considering its subtitle ("Pensées 
de 1848") and other books of 1848 like Bouvard et Pécuchet and The Eighteenth 
Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, is no mean irony. In a sense, then, the manifesto 
generally and Renan's accounts of philology particularly he had by then already written 
the massive philological treatise on Semitic languages that had earned him the Prix 
Volney were designed to place Renan as an intellectual in a clearly perceptible 
relationship to the great social issues raised by 1848. That he should choose to fashion 
such a relationship on the basis of the least immediate of all intellectual disciplines 
(philology), the one with the least degree of apparent popular relevance, the most 
conservative and the most traditional, suggests the extreme deliberateness of Renan's 
position. For he did not really speak as one man to all men but rather as a reflective, 
specialized voice that took, as he put it in the 1890 preface, the inequality of races and 
the necessary domination of the many by the few for granted as an antidemocratic law 
of nature and society.25 
25 
 
But how was it possible for Renan to hold himself and what he was saying in 
such a paradoxical position? For what was philology on the one hand if not a science of 
all humanity, a science premised on the unity of the human species and the worth of 
every human detail, and yet what was the philologist on the other hand if notas Renan 
himself proved with his notorious race prejudice against the very Oriental Semites 
whose study had made his professional name 26--a harsh divider of men into superior 
and inferior races, a liberal critic whose work harbored the most esoteric notions of 
temporality, origins, development, relationship, and human worth? Part of the answer to 
this question is that, as his early letters of philological intent to Victor Cousin, Michelet, 
and Alexander von Humboldt show, 27 Renan had a strong guild sense as a professional 
scholar, a professional Orientalist, in fact, a sense that put distance between himself and 
the masses. But more important, I think, is Renan's own conception of his role as an 
Oriental philologist within philology's larger history, development, and objectives as he 
saw them. In other words, what may to us seem like paradox was the expected result of 
how Renan perceived his dynastic position within philology, its history and inaugural 
discoveries, and what he, Renan, did within it. Therefore Renan should be 
characterized, not as speaking about philology, but rather as speaking philologically 
with all the force of an initiate using the encoded language of a new prestigious science 
none of whose pronouncements about language itself could be construed either directly 
or naively. 
As Renan understood, received, and was instructed in philology, the discipline 
imposed a set of doxological rules upon him. To be a philologist meant to be governed 
in one's activity first of all by a set of recent revaluative discoveries that effectively 
began the science of philology and gave it a distinctive epistemology of its own: I am 
speaking here of the period roughly from the 1780s to the mid 1830s, the latter part of 
which coincides with the period of Renan's beginning his education. His memoirs 
record how the crisis of religious faith that culminated in the loss of that faith led him in 
1845 into a life of scholarship: this was his initiation into philology, its world view, 
crises, and style. He believed that on a personal level his life reflected the institutional 
life of philology. In his life, however, he determined to be as Christian as he once was, 
only now without Christianity and with what he called "la science laique" (lay 
science).28 
The best example of what a lay science could and could not do was provided 
years later by Renan in a lecture given at the Sorbonne in 1878, "On the Services 
Rendered by Philology to the Historical Sciences." What is revealing about this text is 
the way Renan clearly had religion in mind when he spoke about philology for example, 
what philology, like religion, teaches us about the origins of humanity, civilization, and 
language only to make it evident to his hearers that philology could deliver a far less 
coherent, less knitted together and positive message than religion.29 Since Renan was 
irremediably historical and, as he once put it, morphological in his outlook, it stood to 
reason that the only way in which, as a very young man, he could move out of religion 
into philological scholarship was to retain in the new lay science the historical world 
view he had gained from religion. Hence, "one occupation alone seemed to me to be 
worthy of filling my life; and that was to pursue my critical research into Christianity 
[an allusion to Renan's major scholarly project on the history and origins of 
Christianity] using those far ampler means offered me by lay science."30 Renan had 
assimilated himself to philology according to his own post Christian fashion. 
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The difference between the history offered internally by Christianity and the 
history offered by philology, a relatively new discipline, is precisely what made modern 
philology possible, and this Renan knew perfectly. For whenever "philology" is spoken 
of around the end of the eighteenth century and the beginning of the nineteenth, we are 
to understand the new philology, whose major successes include comparative grammar, 
the reclassification of languages into families, and the final rejection of the divine 
origins of language. It is no exaggeration to say that these accomplishments were a 
more or less direct consequence of the view that held language to be an entirely human 
phenomenon. And this view became current once it was discovered empirically that the 
so called sacred languages (Hebrew, primarily) were neither of primordial antiquity nor 
of divine provenance. What Foucault has called the discovery of language was therefore 
a secular event that displaced a religious conception of how God delivered language to 
man in Eden.31 Indeed, one of the consequences of this change, by which, an 
etymological, dynastic notion of linguistic filiation was pushed aside by the view of 
language as a domain all of its own held together with jagged internal structures and 
coherences, is the dramatic subsidence of interest in the problem of the origins of 
language. Whereas in the 1770s, which is when Herder's essay on the origins of 
language wont the 1772 medal from the Berlin Academy, it was all the rage to discuss 
that problem, by the first decade of the new century it was all but banned as a topic for 
learned dispute in Europe. 
On all sides, and in many different ways, what William Jones stated in his 
Anniversary Discourses (1785 1792), or what Franz Bopp put forward in his 
Vergleichende Grammatik (1832), is that the divine dynasty of language was ruptured 
definitively and discredited as an idea. A new historical conception, in short, was 
needed, since Christianity seemed unable to survive the empirical evidence that reduced 
the divine status of its major text. For some, as Chateaubriand put it, faith was 
unshakable despite new knowledge of how Sanskrit outdated Hebrew: "Hélas! il est 
arrivé qu'une connaissance plus approfondie de la langue savante de l'Inde a fait rentrer 
ces siècles innombrables dans le cercle ètroit de la Bible.Bien m'en a pris d'etre 
redevenue croyant, avant d'avoir éprouvé cette mortification."32 (Alas! it has happened 
that a deeper knowledge of the learned language of India has forced innumerable 
centuries into the narrow circle of the Bible. How lucky for me that I have become a 
believer again before having had to experience this mortification.) For others, especially 
philologists like the pioneering Bopp himself, the study of language entailed its own 
history, philosophy, and learning, all of which did away with any notion of a primal 
language given by the Godhead to man in Eden. As the study of Sanskrit and the 
expansive mood of the later eighteenth century seemed to have moved the earliest 
beginnings of civilization very far east of the Biblical lands, so too language became 
less of a continuity between an outside power and the human speaker than an internal 
field created and accomplished by language users among themselves. There was no first 
language, just as   except by a method I shall discuss presently there was no simple 
language. 
The legacy of these first generation philologists was, to Renan, of the highest 
importance, higher even than the work done by Sacy. Whenever he discussed language 
and philology, whether at the beginning, middle, or end of his long career, he repeated 
the lessons of the new philology, of which the antidynastic, anticontinuous tenets of a 
technical (as opposed to a divine) linguistic practice are the major pillar. For the 
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linguist, language cannot be pictured as the result of force emanating unilaterally from 
God. As Coleridge put it, "Language is the armory of the human mind; and at once 
contains the trophies of its past and the weapons of its future conquests."33 The idea of 
a first Edenic language gives way to the heuristic notion of a protolanguage (Indo 
European, Semitic) whose existence is never a subject of debate, since it is 
acknowledged that such a language cannot be recaptured but can only be reconstituted 
in the philological process. To the extent that one language serves, again heuristically, 
as a touchstone for all the others, it is Sanskrit in its earliest Indo European form. The 
terminology has also shifted: there are now families of languages (the analogy with 
species and anatomical classifications is marked), there is perfect linguistic form, which 
need not correspond to any "real" language, and there are original languages only as a 
function of the philological discourse, not because of nature. 
But some writers shrewdly commented on how it was that Sanskrit and things 
Indian in general simply took the place of Hebrew and the Edenic fallacy. As early as 
1804 Benjamin Constant noted in his Journal intime that he was not about to discuss 
India in his De la religion because the English who owned the place and the Germans 
who studied it indefatigably had made India the tons et origo of everything; and then 
there were the French who had decided after Napoleon and Champollion that everything 
originated in Egypt and the new Orient.34 These teleological enthusiasms were fueled 
after 1808 by Friedrich Schlegel's celebrated Über die Sprache and Weisheit der Indier, 
which seemed to confirm his own pronouncement made in 1800 about the Orient being 
the purest form of Romanticism.What Renan's generation educated from the mid 1830s 
to the late 1840s--retained from all this enthusiasm about the Orient was the intellectual 
necessity of the Orient for the Occidental scholar of languages, cultures, and 
religions.Here the key text was Edgar Quinet's Le Génie des religions (1832), a work 
that announced the Oriental Renaissance and placed the Orient and the West in a 
functional relationship with each other. I have already referred to the vast meaning of 
this relationship as analyzed comprehensively by Raymond Schwab in La Renaissance 
orientale; my concern with it here is only to note specific aspects of it that bear upon 
Renan's vocation as a philologist and as an Orientalist. Quinet's association with 
Michelet, their interest in Herder and Vico, respectively, impressed on them the need 
for the scholar historian to confront, almost in the manner of an audience seeing a 
dramatic event unfold, or a believer witnessing a revelation, the different, the strange, 
the distant. Quinet's formulation was that the Orient proposes and the West disposes: 
Asia has its prophets, Europe its doctors (its learned men, its scientists: the pun is 
intended). Out of this encounter, a new dogma or god is born, but Quinet's point is that 
both East and West fulfill their destinies and confirm their identities in the encounter. 
As a scholarly attitude the picture of a learned Westerner surveying as if from a 
peculiarly suited vantage point the passive, seminal, feminine, even silent and supine 
East, then going on to articulate the East, making the Orient deliver up its secrets under 
the learned authority of a philologist whose power derives from the ability to unlock 
secret, esoteric languages this would persist in Renan. What did not persist in Renan 
during the 1840s, when he served his apprenticeship as a philologist, was the dramatic 
attitude: that was replaced by the scientific attitude. 
For Quinet and Michelet, history was a drama. Quinet suggestively describes the 
whole world as a temple and human history as a sort of religious rite. Both Michelet and 
Quinet saw the world they discussed. The origin of¬human history was something they 
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could describe in the same splendid and impassioned and dramatic terms used by Vico 
and Rousseau to portray life on earth in primitive times. For Michelet and Quinet there 
is no doubt that they belong to the communal European Romantic undertaking "either in 
epic or some other major genre in drama, in prose romance, or in the visionary `greater 
Ode' radically to recast into terms appropriate to the historical and intellectual 
circumstances of their own age, the Christian pattern of the fall, the redemption, and the 
emergence of a new earth which will constitute a restored paradise."35 I think that for 
Quinet the idea of a new god being born was tantamount to the filling of the place left 
by the old god; for Renan, however, being a philologist meant the severance of any and 
all connections with the old Christian god, so that instead a new doctrine probably 
science would stand free and in a new place, as it were. Renan's whole career was 
devoted to the fleshing out of this progress. 
He put it very plainly at the end of his undistinguished essay on the origins of 
language: man is no longer an inventor, and the age of creation is definitely 
over.36There was a period, at which we can only guess, when man was literally 
transported from silence into words. After that there was language, and for the true 
scientist the task is to examine how language is, not how it came about. Yet if Renan 
dispels the passionate creation of primitive times (which had excited Herder, Vico, 
Rousseau, even Quinet and Michelet) he instates a new, and deliberate, type of artificial 
creation, one that is performed as a result of scientific analysis. In his leçon inaugurale 
at the College de France (February 21, 1862) Renan proclaimed his lectures open to the 
public so that it might see at first hand "le laboratoire même de la science philologique" 
(the very laboratory of philological science).37 Any reader of Renan would have 
understood that such a statement was meant also to carry a typical if rather limp irony, 
one less intended to shock than passively to delight.For Renan was succeeding to the 
chair of Hebrew, and his lecture was on the contribution of the Semitic peoples to the 
history of civilization. What more subtle affront could there be to "sacred" history than 
the substitution of a philological laboratory for divine intervention in history; and what 
more telling way was there of declaring the Orient's contemporary relevance to be 
simply as material for European investigation? 38 Sacy's comparatively lifeless 
fragments arranged in tableaux were now being replaced with something new. 
The stirring peroration with which Renan concluded his leçon had another 
function than simply to connect Oriental Semitic philology with the future and with 
science. Ĕtienne Quatremère, who immediately preceded Renan in the chair of Hebrew, 
was a scholar who seemed to exemplify the popular caricature of what a scholar was 
like. A man of prodigiously industrious and pedantic habits, he went about his work, 
Renan said in a relatively unfeeling memorial minute for the Journal des débats in 
October 1857, like a laborious worker who even in rendering immense services 
nevertheless could not see the whole edifice being constructed. The edifice was nothing 
less than "la science historique de l'esprit humain," now in the process of being built 
stone by stone.39 Just as Quatremère was not of this age, so Renan in his work was 
determined to be of it. Moreover, if the Orient had been hitherto identified exclusively 
and indiscriminately with India and China, Renan's ambition was to carve out a new 
Oriental province for himself, in this case the Semitic Orient. He had no doubt remarked 
the casual, and surely current, confusion of Arabic with Sanskrit (as in Balzac's La Peau 
de chagrin, where the fateful talisman's Arabic script is described as Sanskrit), and he 
made it his job accordingly to do for the Semitic languages what Bopp had done for the 
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Indo¬European: so he said in the 1855 preface to the comparative Semitic treatise.40 
Therefore Renan's plans were to bring the Semitic languages into sharp and glamorous 
focus à la Bopp, and in addition to elevate the study of these neglected inferior 
languages to the level of a passionate new science of mind à la Louis Lambert. 
On more than one occasion Renan was quite explicit in his assertions that 
Semites and Semitic were creations of Orientalist philo¬logical study.41Since he was 
the man who did the study, there was meant to be little ambiguity about the centrality of 
his role in this new, artificial creation. But how did Renan mean the word creation in 
these instances? And how was this creation connected with either natural creation, or 
the creation ascribed by Renan and others to the laboratory and to the classificatory and 
natural sciences, principally what was called philosophical anatomy? Here we must 
speculate a little. Throughout his career Renan seemed to imagine the role of science in 
human life as (and I quote in translation as literally as I can) "telling (speaking or 
articulating) definitively to man the word [logos?] of things."42  
Science gives speech to things; better yet, science brings out, causes to be 
pronounced, a potential speech within things. The special value of linguistics (as the 
new philology was then often called) is not that natural science resembles it, but rather 
that it treats words as natural, otherwise silent objects, which are made to give up their 
secrets. Remember that the major breakthrough in the study of inscriptions and 
hiero¬glyphs was the discovery by Champollion that the symbols on the Rosetta Stone 
had a phonetic as well as a semantic component.43 To make objects speak was like 
making words speak, giving them circumstantial value, and a precise place in a rule 
governed order of regularity. In its first sense, creation, as Renan used the word, 
signified the articulation by which an object like Semitic could be seen as a creature of 
sorts. Second, creation also signified the setting  in the case of Semitic it meant Oriental 
history, culture, race, mind illuminated and brought forward from its reticence by the 
scientist. Finally, creation was the formulation of a system of classi¬fication by which it 
was possible to see the object in question comparatively with other like objects; and by 
"comparatively" Renan intended a complex network of paradigmatic relations that 
obtained between Semitic and Indo European languages. 
If in what I have so far said I have insisted so much on Renan's comparatively 
forgotten study of Semitic languages, it has been for several important reasons. Semitic 
was the scientific study to which Renan turned right after the loss of his Christian faith; 
I described above how he came to see the study of Semitic as replacing his faith and 
enabling .a critical future relation with it. The study of Semitic was Renan's first full 
length Orientalist and scientific study (finished in 1847, published first in 1855), and 
was as much a part of his late major works on the origins of Christianity and the history 
of the Jews as it was a propaedeutic for them. In intention, if not perhaps in 
achievement interestingly, few of the standard or contemporary works in either 
linguistic history or the history of Orientalism cite Renan with anything more than 
cursory attention44  -- his Semitic opus was proposed as a philological breakthrough, 
from which in later years he was always to draw retrospective authority for his positions 
(almost always bad ones) on religion, race, and nationalism.45 Whenever Renan wished 
to make a statement about either the Jews or the Muslims, for example, it was always 
with his remarkably harsh (and unfounded, except according to the science he was 
practicing) strictures on the Semites in mind. Furthermore, Renan's Semitic was meant 
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as a contribution both to the development of Indo European linguistics and to the 
differentiation of Orientalisms. To the former Semitic was a degraded form, degraded in 
both the moral and the biological sense, whereas to the latter Semitic was a if not the 
stable form of cultural decadence. Lastly, Semitic was Renan's first creation, a fiction 
invented by him in the philological laboratory to satisfy his sense of public place and 
mission. It should by no means be lost on us that Semitic was for Renan's ego the 
symbol of European (and consequently his) dominion over the Orient and over his own 
era. 
Therefore, as a branch of the Orient, Semitic was not fully a natural object¬ like 
a species of monkey, for instance nor fully an unnatural or a divine object, as it had 
once been considered. Rather, Semitic occupied a median position, legitimated in its 
oddities (regularity being defined by Indo¬-European) by an inverse relation to normal 
languages, comprehended as an eccentric, quasimonstrous phenomenon partly because 
libraries, laboratories, and museums could serve as its place of exhibition and analysis. 
In his treatise, Renan adopted a tone of voice and a method of exposition that drew the 
maximum from book learning and from natural observation as practiced by men like 
Cuvier and the Geoffroy Saint-Hilaires père et fils. This is an important stylistic 
achievement, for it allowed Renan consistently to avail himself of the library, rather 
than either primitivity or divine fiat, as a conceptual framework in which to understand 
language, together with the museum, which is where the results of laboratory 
observation. are delivered for exhibition, study, and teaching.46 Everywhere Renan 
treats of normal human facts language, history, culture, mind, imagination as 
transformed into something else, as something peculiarly deviant, because they are 
Semitic and Oriental, and because they end up for analysis in the laboratory. Thus the 
Semites are rabid monotheists who produced no mythology, no art, no commerce, no 
civilization; their consciousness is a narrow and rigid one; all in all they represent "une 
combinaison inférieure de la nature humaine."47 At the same time Renan wants it 
understood that he speaks of a prototype, .not a real Semitic type with actual existence 
(although he violated this too by discussing present day Jews and Muslims with less 
than scientific detachment in many places in his writings).48 So on the one hand we 
have the transformation of the human into the specimen, and on the other the 
comparative judgment rendered by which the specimen remains a specimen and a 
subject for philological, scientific study. 
Scattered throughout the Histoire générale et systéme comparé des langues 
sémitiques are reflections on the links between linguistics and anatomy, and¬for Renan 
this is equally important remarks on how these links could be employed to do human 
history (les sciences historiques). But first we should consider the implicit links. I do 
not think it wrong or an exaggeration to say that a typical page of Renan's Orientalist 
Histoire générale was constructed typographically and structurally with a page of 
comparative philosophical anatomy, in the style of Cuvier or Geoffroy Saint Hilaire, 
kept in mind. Both linguists and anatomists purport to be speaking about matters not 
directly obtainable or observable in nature; a skeleton and a detailed line drawing of a 
muscle, as much as paradigms constituted by the linguists out of a purely hypothetical 
proto Semitic or proto Indo European, are similarly products of the laboratory and of 
the library. The text of a linguistic or an anatomical work bears the same general 
relation to nature (or actuality) that a museum case exhibiting a specimen mammal or 
organ does. What is given on the page and in the museum case is a truncated 
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exaggeration, like many of Sacy's Oriental extracts, whose purpose is to exhibit a 
relationship between the science (or scientist) and the object, not one between the object 
and nature. Read almost any page by Renan on Arabic, Hebrew, Aramaic, or proto-
¬Semitic and you read a fact of power, by which the Orientalist philologist's authority 
summons out of the library at will examples of man's speech, and ranges them there 
surrounded by a suave European prose that points out defects, virtues, barbarisms, and 
shortcomings in the language, the people, and the civilization. The tone and the tense of 
the exhibition are cast almost uniformly in the contemporary present, so that one is 
given an impression of a pedagogical demonstration during which the scholar scientist 
stands before us on a lecture laboratory platform, creating, confining, and judging the 
material he discusses. 
This anxiety on Renan's part to convey the sense of a demonstration actually 
taking place is heightened when he remarks explicitly that whereas anatomy employs 
stable and visible signs by which to consign objects to classes, linguistics does not.49 
Therefore the philologist must make a given linguistic fact correspond in some way to a 
historical period: hence the possibility of a classification. Yet, as Renan was often to 
say, linguistic temporality and history are full of lacunae, enormous discontinuities, 
hypothetical periods. Therefore linguistic events occur in a nonlinear and essentially 
discontinuous temporal dimension controlled by the linguist in a very particular way. 
That way, as Renan's whole treatise on the Semitic branch of the Oriental languages 
goes very far to show, is comparative: Indo European is taken as the living, organic 
norm, and Semitic Oriental languages are seen comparatively to be inorganic.50 Time is 
transformed into the space of comparative classification, which at bottom is based on a 
rigid binary opposition between organic and inorganic languages. So on the one hand 
there is the organic, biologically generative process represented by Indo-European, 
while on the other there is an inorganic, essentially unregenerative process, ossified into 
Semitic: most important, Renan makes it absolutely clear that such an imperious 
judgment is made by the Oriental philologist in his laboratory, for distinctions of the 
kind he has been concerned with are neither possible nor available for anyone except 
the trained professional. "Nous refusons donc aux langues sémitiques la faculté de se 
régénérer, toute en reconnaissant qu'elles n'échappent pas plus que les autres oeuvres de 
la conscience humaine à la néessité du changement et des modifications successives" 
(Therefore we refuse to allow that the Semitic languages have the capacity to regenerate 
themselves, even while recognizing that they do not escape any more than other 
products of human consciousness the necessity of change or of successive 
modifications).51 
Yet behind even this radical opposition, there is another one working in Renan's 
mind, and for several pages in the first chapter of book 5 he exposes his position quite 
candidly to the reader. This occurs when he introduces Saint¬-Hilaire's views on the 
"degradation of types."52 Although Renan does not specify which Saint-Hilaire he 
refers to, the reference is clear enough. For both Étienne and his son Isidore were 
biological speculators of extraordinary fame and influence, particularly among literary 
intellectuals during the first half of the nineteenth century in France. Étienne, we recall, 
had been a member of the Napoleonic expedition, and Balzac dedicated an important 
section of the preface for La Comédie  humaine to him; there is also much evidence that 
Flaubert read both the father and the son and used their views in his work.53 
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Not only were Étienne and Isidore legatees of the tradition of "Romantic" 
biology, which included Goethe and Cuvier, with a strong interest in analogy, 
homology, and organic ur form among species, but they were also specialists in the 
philosophy and anatomy of monstrosity-teratology, as Isidore called it-¬in which the 
most horrendous physiological aberrations were considered a result of internal 
degradation within the species life.54 I cannot here go into the intricacies (as well as the 
macabre fascination) of teratology, though it is enough to mention that both Etienne and 
Isidore exploited the theoretical power of the linguistic paradigm to explain the 
deviations possible within a biological system. Thus Étienne's notion was that a monster 
is an anomaly, in the same sense that in language words exist in analogical as well as 
anomalous relations with each other: in linguistics the idea is at least as old as Varro's 
De Lingua Latina. No anomaly can be considered simply as a gratuitous exception; 
rather anomalies confirm the regular structure binding together all members of the same 
class. Such a view is quite daring in anatomy. At one moment in the "Préliminaire" to 
his Philosophie anatomique Étienne says:And, indeed, such is the character of our 
epoch that it becomes impossible today to enclose oneself strictly within the framework 
of a simple monograph. Study an object in isolation and you will only be able to bring it 
back to itself; consequently you can never have perfect knowledge of it. But see it in the 
midst of beings who are connected with each other in many different ways, and which 
are isolated from each other in different ways, and you will discover for this object a 
wider scope of relationships. First of all, you will know it better, even in its specificity: 
but more important, by considering it in the very center of its own sphere of activity, 
you will know precisely how it behaves in its own exterior world, and you will also 
know how its own features are constituted in reaction to its surrounding milieu.55 
Not only is Saint Hilaire saying that it is the specific character of contemporary 
study (he was writing in 1822) to examine phenomena comparatively; he is also saying 
that for the scientist there is no such thing as a phenomenon, no matter how aberrant 
and exceptional, that cannot be explained with reference to other phenomena. Note also 
how Saint Hilaire employs the metaphor of centrality (le centre de sa sphère d'activitè) 
used later by Renan in L'Avenir de la science to describe the position occupied by any 
object in nature including even the philologist once the object is scientifically placed 
there by the examining scientist. Thereafter between the object and the scientist a bond 
of sympathy is established. Of course, this can only take place during the laboratory 
experience, and not elsewhere. The point being made is that a scientist has at his 
disposal a sort of leverage by which even the totally unusual occurrence can be seen 
naturally and known scientifically, which in this case means without recourse to the 
supernatural, and with recourse only to an enveloping environment constituted by the 
scientist. As a result nature itself can be reperceived as continuous, harmoniously 
coherent, and fundamentally intelligible. 
Thus for Renan Semitic is a phenomenon of arrested development in 
comparison with the mature languages and cultures of the Indo European group, and 
even with the other Semitic Oriental languages.56 The paradox that Renan sustains, 
however, is that even as he encourages us to see languages as in some way 
corresponding to "etres vivants de la nature," he is everywhere else proving that his 
Oriental languages, the Semitic languages, are inorganic, arrested, totally ossified, 
incapable of self regeneration; in other words, he proves that Semitic is not a live 
language, and for that matter, neither are Semites live creatures. Moreover, Indo 
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European language and culture are alive and organic because of the laboratory, not 
despite it. But far from being a marginal issue in Renan's work, this paradox stands, I 
believe, at the very center of his entire work, his style, and his archival existence in the 
culture of his time, a culture to which as people so unlike each other as Matthew 
Arnold, Oscar Wilde, James Frazer, and Marcel Proust concurred  he was a very 
important contributor. To be able to sustain a vision that incorporates and holds together 
life and quasi living creatures (Indo European, European culture) as well as 
quasimonstrous, parallel inorganic phenomena (Semitic, Oriental culture) is precisely 
the achievement of the European scientist in his laboratory. He constructs, and the very 
act of construction is a sign of imperial power over recalcitrant phenomena, as well as a 
confirmation of the dominating culture and its "naturalization." Indeed, it is not too 
much to say that Renan's philological laboratory is the actual locale of his European 
ethnocentrism; but what needs emphasis here is that the philological laboratory has no 
existence outside the discourse, the writing by which it is constantly produced and 
experienced. Thus even the culture he calls organic and alive-Europe's is also a creature 
being created in the laboratory and by philology. 
Renan's entire later career was European and cultural. Its accomplishments were 
varied and celebrated. Whatever authority his style possessed can, I think, be traced 
back to his technique for constructing the inorganic (or the missing) and for giving it the 
appearance of life. He was most famous, of course, for his Vie de Jésus, the work that 
inaugurated his monumental histories of Christianity and the Jewish people. Yet we 
must realize that the Vie was exactly the same type of feat that the Histoire générale 
was, a construction enabled by the historian's capacity for skillfully crafting a dead 
(dead for Renan in the double sense of a dead faith and a lost, hence dead, historical 
period) Oriental biography  and the paradox is immediately apparent as if it were the 
truthful narrative of a natural life. Whatever Renan said had first passed through the 
philological laboratory; when it appeared in print woven through the text, there was in it 
the life giving force of a contemporary cultural signature, which drew from modernity 
all its scientific power and all its uncritical self approbation. For that sort of culture such 
genealogies as dynasty, tradition, religion, ethnic communities were all simply 
functions of a theory whose job was to instruct the world. In borrowing this latter phrase 
from Cuvier, Renan was circumspectly placing scientific demonstration over 
experience; temporality was relegated to the scientifically useless realm of ordinary 
experience, while to the special periodicity of culture and cultural comparativism 
(which spawned ethnocentrism, racial theory, and economic oppression) were given 
powers far in advance of moral vision. 
Renan's style, his career as Orientalist and man of letters, the circumstances of 
the meaning he communicates, his peculiarly intimate relationship with the European 
scholarly and general culture of his time liberal, exclusivist, imperious, antihuman 
except in a very conditional sense all these are what I would call celibate and scientific. 
Generation for him is consigned to the realm of I'avenir, which in his famous manifesto 
he associated with science. Although as a historian of culture he belongs to the school 
of men like Turgot, Condorcet, Guizot, Cousin, Jouffroy, and Ballanche, and in 
scholarship to the school of Sacy, Caussin de Perceval, Ozanam, Fauriel, and Burnouf, 
Renan's is a peculiarly ravaged, ragingly masculine world of history and learning; it is 
indeed the world, not of fathers, mothers, and children, but of men like his Jesus, his 
Marcus Aurelius, his Caliban, his solar god (the last as described in "Rêves" of the 
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Dialogues philosophiques).57 He cherished the power of science and Orientalist 
philology particularly; he sought its insights and its techniques; he used it to intervene, 
often with considerable effectiveness, in the life of his epoch. And yet his ideal role was 
that of spectator. 
According to Renan, a philologist ought to prefer bonheur to jouissance: the 
preference expresses a choice of elevated, if sterile, happiness over sexual pleasure. 
Words belong to the realm of bonheur, as does the study of words, ideally speaking. To 
my knowledge, there are very few moments in all of Renan's public writing where a 
beneficent and instrumental role is assigned to women. One occurs when Renan opines 
that foreign women (nurses, maids) must have instructed the conquering Normans' 
children, and hence we can account for the changes that take place in language. Note 
how productivity and dissemination are not the functions aided, but rather internal 
change, and a subsidiary one at that. "Man," he says at the end of the same essay, 
"belongs neither to his language nor to his race; he belongs to himself before all, since 
before all he is a free being and a moral one."58 Man was free and moral, but enchained 
by race, history, and science as Renan saw them, conditions imposed by the scholar on 
man. 
The study of Oriental languages took Renan to the heart of these conditions, and 
philology made it concretely apparent that knowledge of man was to paraphrase Ernst 
Cassirer poetically transfiguring59 only if it had been previously severed from raw 
actuality (as Sacy had necessarily severed his Arabic fragments from their actuality) and 
then put into a doxological straitjacket. By becoming philology, the study of words as 
once practiced by Vico, Herder, Rousseau, Michelet, and Quinet lost its plot and its 
dramatic presentational quality, as Schelling once called it. Instead, philology became 
epistemologically complex; Sprachgefűhl was no longer enough since words 
themselves pertained less to the senses or the body (as they had for Vico) and more to a 
sightless, imageless, and abstract realm ruled over by such hothouse formulations as 
race, mind, culture, and nation. In that realm, which was discursively constructed and 
called the Orient, certain kinds of assertions could be made, all of them possessing the 
same  powerful generality and cultural validity. For all of Renan's effort was to deny 
Oriental culture the right to be generated, except artificially in the philo¬logical 
laboratory. A man was not a child of the culture; that dynastic conception had been too 
effectively challenged by philology. Philology taught one how culture is a construct, an 
articulation (in the sense that Dickens used the word for Mr. Venus's profession in Our 
Mutual Friend), even a creation, but not anything more than a quasi organic structure. 
What is specially interesting in Renan is how much he knew himself to be a 
creature of his time and of his ethnocentric culture. On the occasion of an academic 
response to a speech made by Ferdinand de Lesseps in 1885, Renan averred as how "it 
was so sad to be a wiser man than one's nation .... One cannot feel bitter¬ness towards 
one's homeland. Better to be mistaken along with the nation than to be too right with 
those who tell it hard truths."60 The economy of such a statement is almost too perfect 
to be true. For does not the old Renan say that the best relationship is one of parity with 
one's own culture, its morality, and its ethos during one's time, that and not a dynastic 
relation by which one is either the child of his times or their parent? And here we return 
to the laboratory, for it is there as Renan thought of it that filial and ultimately social 
responsibilities cease and scientific and Orientalist ones take over. His laboratory was 
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the platform from which as an Orientalist he addressed the world; it mediated the 
statements he made, gave them confidence and general precision, as well as continuity. 
Thus the philological laboratory as Renan understood it redefined not only his epoch 
and his culture, dating and shaping them in new ways; it gave his Oriental subject 
matter a scholarly coherence, and more, it made him (and later Orientalists in his 
tradition) into the Occidental cultural figure he then became. We may well wonder 
whether this new autonomy within the culture was the freedom Renan hoped his 
philological Orientalist science would bring or whether, so far as a critical historian of 
Orientalism is concerned, it set up a complex affiliation between Orientalism and its 
putative human subject matter that is based finally on power and not really on 
disinterested objectivity. 
III Oriental Residence and Scholarship:The Requirements of Lexicography 
and Imagination 
Renan's views of the Oriental Semites belong, of course, less to the realm of 
popular prejudice and common anti  Semitism than they do to the realm of scientific 
Oriental philology. When we read Renan and Sacy, we readily observe the way cultural 
generalization had begun to acquire the armor of scientific statement and the ambience 
of corrective study. Like many academic specialties in their early phases, modern 
Orientalism held its subject matter, which it defined, in a viselike grip which it did 
almost everything in its power to sustain. Thus a knowing vocabulary developed, and its 
functions, as much as its style, located the Orient in a comparative framework, of the 
sort employed and manipulated by Renan. Such comparatism is rarely descriptive; most 
often, it is both evaluative and expository. Here is Renan comparing typically: 
One sees that in all things the Semitic race appears to us to be an incomplete 
race, by virtue of its simplicity. This race if I dare use the analogy is to the Indo 
European family what a pencil sketch is to painting; it lacks that variety, that amplitude, 
that abundance of life which is the condition of perfectibility. Like those individuals 
who possess so little fecundity that, after a gracious childhood, they attain only the most 
mediocre virility, the Semitic nations experienced their fullest flowering in their first 
age and have never been able to achieve true maturity. 61 
Indo Europeans are the touchstone here, just as they are when Renan says that 
the Semitic Oriental sensibility never reached the heights attained by the Indo Germanic 
races.Whether this comparative attitude is principally a scholarly neces¬sity or whether 
it is disguised ethnocentric race prejudice, we cannot say with absolute certainty. What 
we can say is that the two work together, in support of each other. What Renan and 
Sacy tried to do was to reduce the Orient to a kind of human flatness, which exposed its 
characteristics easily to scrutiny and removed from it its complicating humanity. In 
Renan's case, the legitimacy of his efforts was provided by philology, whose ideological 
tenets encourage the reduction of a language to its roots; thereafter, the philologist finds 
it possible to connect those linguistics roots, as Renan and others did, to race, mind, 
character, and temperament at their roots. The affinity between Renan and Gobineau, 
for example, was acknowledged by Renan to be a common philological and Orientalist 
perspective; 62 in subsequent editions of the Histoire générale he incorporated some of 
Gobineau's work within his own. Thus did comparatism in the study of the Orient and 
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Orientals come to be synonymous with the apparent ontological inequality of Occident 
and Orient. 
The main traits of this inequality are worth recapitulating briefly. I have already 
referred to Schlegel's enthusiasm for India, and then his subsequent revulsion from it 
and of course from Islam. Many of the earliest Oriental amateurs began by welcoming 
the Orient as a salutary dérangement of their European habits of mind and spirit. The 
Orient was overvalued for its pantheism, its spirituality, its stability, its longevity, its 
primitivity, and so forth. Schelling, for example, saw in Oriental polytheism a 
preparation of the way for Judeo Christian monotheism: Abraham was prefigured in 
Brahma. Yet almost without exception such overesteem was followed by a 
counterresponse: the Orient suddenly appeared lamentably underhumanized, 
antidemocratic, backward, barbaric, and so forth. A swing of the pendulum in one 
direction caused an equal and opposite swing back: the Orient was undervalued. 
Orientalism as a profession grew out of these opposites, of compensations and 
corrections based on inequality, ideas nourished by and nourishing similar ideas in the 
culture at large. Indeed the very project of restriction and restructuring associated with 
Orientalism can be traced directly to the inequality by which the Orient's comparative 
poverty (or wealth) besought scholarly, scientific treatment of the kind to be found in 
disciplines like philology, biology, history, anthropology, philosophy, or 
economics.And thus the actual profession of Orientalist enshrined this inequality and 
the special paradoxes it engendered. Most often an individual entered the profession as 
a way of reckoning with the Orient's claim on him; yet most often too his Orientalist 
training opened his eyes, so to speak, and what he was left with was a sort of debunking 
project, by which the Orient was reduced to considerably less than the eminence once 
seen in it. How else is one to explain the enormous labors represented by the work of 
William Muir (1819 1905 ), for example, or of Reinhart Dozy (1820 1883 ), and the 
impressive antipathy in that work to the Orient, Islam, and the Arabs? 
Characteristically, Renan was one of Dozy's supporters, just as in Dozy's four volume 
Histoire des Mussulmans d'Espagne, jusqu à la conquête de 1'Andalousie par les 
Almoravides (1861) there appear many of Renan's anti Semitic strictures, compounded 
in 1864 by a volume arguing that the Jews' primitive God was not Jahweh but Baal, 
proof for which was to be found in Mecca, of all places. Muir's Life of Mahomet (1858 
1861) and his The Caliphate, Its Rise, Decline and Fall (1891) are still considered 
reliable monuments of scholarship, yet his attitude towards his subject matter was fairly 
put by him when he slid that "the sword of Muhammed, and the Kor'ān, are the most 
stubborn enemies of Civilisation, Liberty, and the Truth which the world has yet 
known."63 Many of the same notions are to be found in the work of Alfred Lyall, who 
was one of the authors cited approvingly by Cromer. 
Even if the Orientalist does not explicitly judge his material as Dozy and Muir 
did, the principle of inequality exerts its influence nevertheless. It remains the 
professional Orientalist's job to piece together a portrait, a restored picture as it were, of 
the Orient or the Oriental; fragments, such as those unearthed by Sacy, supply the 
material, but the narrative shape, continuity, and figures are constructed by the scholar, 
for whom scholarship consists of circumventing the unruly (un Occidental) nonhistory 
of the Orient with orderly chronicle, portraits, and plots. Caussin de Perceval's Essai sur 
l'histoire des Arabes avant l'Islamisme, pendant l'époque de Mahomet (three volumes, 
1847 1848) is a wholly professional study, depending for its sources on documents 
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made available internally to the field by other Orientalists (principally Sacy, of course) 
or documents like the texts of ibn-¬Khaldun, upon whom Caussin relied very heavily 
reposing in Orientalist libraries in Europe. Caussin's thesis is that the Arabs were made 
a people by Mohammed, Islam being essentially a political instrument, not by any 
means a spiritual one. What Caussin strives for is clarity amidst a huge mass of 
confusing detail. Thus what emerges out of the study of Islam is quite literally a one 
dimensional portrait of Mohammed, who is made to appear at the end of the work (after 
his death has been described) in precise photographic detail.64 Neither a demon, nor a 
prototype of Cagliostro, Caussin's Mohammed is a man appropriated to a history of 
Islam (the fittest version of it) as an exclusively political movement, centralized by the 
innumerable citations that thrust him up and, in a sense, out of the text. Caussin's 
intention was to leave nothing unsaid about Mohammed; the Prophet is thereby seen in 
a cold light, stripped both of his immense religious force and of any residual powers to 
frighten Europeans. The point here is that as a figure for his own time and place 
Mohammed is effaced, in order for a very slight human miniature of him to be left 
standing. 
A nonprofessional analogue to Caussin's Mohammed is Carlyle's, a Mohammed 
forced to serve a thesis totally overlooking the historical and cultural circumstances of 
the Prophet's own time and place. Although Carlyle quotes Sacy, his essay is clearly the 
product of someone arguing for some general ideas on sincerity, heroism, and 
prophethood. His attitude is salutary: Mohammed is no legend, no shameful sensualist, 
no laughable petty sorcerer who trained pigeons to pick peas out of his ear. Rather he is 
a man of real vision and self conviction, albeit an author of a book, the Koran, that is "a 
wearisome confused jumble, crude, incondite; endless iterations, long windedness, 
entanglement; most crude, incondite-insupportable stupidity, in short."65 Not a paragon 
of lucidity and stylistic grace himself, Carlyle asserts these things as a way of rescuing 
Mohammed from the Benthamite standards that would have condemned both 
Mohammed and him together. Yet Mohammed is a hero, transplanted into Europe out 
of the same barbaric Orient found wanting by Lord Macaulay in his famous "Minute" of 
1835, in which it was asserted that "our native subjects" have more to learn from us than 
we do from them.66 
Both Caussin and Carlyle, in other words, show us that the Orient need not 
cause us undue anxiety, so unequal are Oriental to European achievements. The 
Orientalist and non Orientalist perspectives coincide here. For within the comparative 
field that Orientalism became after the philological revolution of the early nineteenth 
century, and outside it, either in popular stereotypes or in the figures made of the Orient 
by philosophers like Carlyle and stereotypes like those of Macaulay, the Orient in itself 
was subordinated intellectually to the West. As material for study or reflection the 
Orient acquired all the marks of an inherent weakness. It became subject to the vagaries 
of miscellaneous theories that used it for illustration. Cardinal Newman, no great 
Orientalist, used Oriental Islam as the basis of lectures in 1853 justifying British 
intervention in the Crimean War.67 Cuvier found the Orient useful for his work Le 
Règne animal (1816). The Orient was usefully employed as conversation in the various 
salons of Paris.68 The list of references, borrowings, and transformations that overtook 
the Oriental idea is immense, but at bottom what the early Orientalist achieved, and 
what the non Orientalist in the West exploited, was a reduced model of the Orient 
suitable for the prevailing, dominant culture and its theoretical (and hard after the 
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theoretical, the practical) exigencies. Occasionally one comes across exceptions, or if 
not exceptions then interesting complications, to this unequal partnership between East 
and West. Karl Marx identified the notion of an Asiatic economic system in his 1853 
analyses of British rule in India, and then put beside that immediately the human 
depredation introduced into this system by English colonial interference, rapacity, and 
outright cruelty. In article after article he returned with increasing conviction to the idea 
that even in destroying Asia, Britain was making possible there a real social revolution. 
Marx's style pushes us right up against the difficulty of reconciling our natural 
repugnance as fellow creatures to the sufferings of Orientals while their society is being 
violently transformed with the historical necessity of these transformations. 
Now, sickening as it must be to human feeling to witness those myriads of 
industrious patriarchal and inoffensive social organizations disorganized and dissolved 
into their units, thrown into a sea of woes, and their individual members losing at the 
same time their ancient form of civilization and their hereditary means of subsistence, 
we must not forget that these idyllic village communities, inoffensive though they may 
appear, had always been the solid foundation of Oriental despotism, that they restrained 
the human mind within the smallest possible compass, making it the unresisting tool of 
superstition, enslaving it beneath the traditional rules, depriving it of all grandeur and 
historical energies .... 
England, it is true, in causing a social revolution in Hindustan was actuated only 
by the vilest interests, and was stupid in her manner of enforcing them. But that is not 
the question. The question is, can mankind fulfil its destiny without a fundamental 
revolution in the social state of Asia? If not, whatever may have been the crimes of 
England she was the unconscious tool of history in bringing about that revolution. 
Then, whatever bitterness the spectacle of the crumbling of an ancient world 
may have for our personal feelings, we have the right, in point of history, to exclaim 
with Goethe: 
 
Sollte these Qual uns qualen 
Da she unsere Lust vermehrt 
Hat nicht Myriaden Seelen 
Timurs Herrschaft aufgeziehrt?69 
 (Should this torture then torment us  
Since it brings us greater pleasure?  
Were not through the rule of Timur 
Souls devoured without measure?) 
39 
 
 
The quotation, which supports Marx's argument about torment producing 
pleasure, comes from the Westőstlicher Diwan and identifies the sources of Marx's 
conceptions about the Orient. These are Romantic and even messianic: as human 
material the Orient is less important than as an element in a Romantic redemptive 
project. Marx's economic analyses are perfectly fitted thus to a standard Orientalist 
undertaking, even though Marx's humanity, his sympathy for the misery of people, are 
clearly engaged. Yet in the end it is the Romantic Orientalist vision that wins out, as 
Marx's theoretical socio economic views become submerged in this classically standard 
image:England has to fulfill a double mission in India: one destructive, the other 
regenerating the annihilation of the Asiatic society, and the laying of the material 
foundations of Western society in Asia.70 
The idea of regenerating a fundamentally lifeless Asia is a piece of pure 
Romantic Orientalism, of course, but coming from the same writer who could not easily 
forget the human suffering involved, the statement is puzzling. It requires us first to ask 
how Marx's moral equation of Asiatic loss with the British colonial rule he condemned 
gets skewed back towards the old inequality between East and West we have so far 
remarked. Second, it requires us to ask where the human sympathy has gone, into what 
realm of thought it has disappeared while the Orientalist vision takes its place. 
We are immediately brought back to the realization that Orientalists, like many 
other early nineteenth century thinkers, conceive of humanity either in large collective 
terms or in abstract generalities. Orientalists are neither interested in nor capable of 
discussing individuals; instead artificial entities, perhaps with their roots in Herderian 
populism, predominate. There are Orientals, Asiatics, Semites, Muslims, Arabs, Jews, 
races, mentalities, nations, and the like, some of them the product of learned operations 
of the type found in Renan's work. Similarly, the age old distinction between "Europe" 
and "Asia" or "Occident" and "Orient" herds beneath very wide labels every possible 
variety of human plurality, reducing it in the process to one or two terminal, collective 
abstrac¬tions. Marx is no exception. The collective Orient was easier for him to use in 
illustration of a theory than existential human identities. For between Orient and 
Occident, as if in a self fulfilling proclamation, only the vast anonymous collectivity 
mattered, or existed. No other type of exchange, severely constrained though it may 
have been, was at hand. 
That Marx was still able to sense some fellow feeling, to identify even a little 
with poor Asia, suggests that something hap¬pened before the labels took over, before 
he was dispatched to Goethe as a source of wisdom on the Orient. It is as if the 
individual mind (Marx's, in this case) could find a precollective, preofficial 
individuality in Asia find and give in to its pressures upon his emotions, feelings, senses 
only to give it up when he confronted a more formidable censor in the very vocabulary 
he found himself forced to employ. What that censor did was to stop and then chase 
away the sympathy, and this was accompanied by a lapidary defini¬tion: Those people, 
it said, don't suffer they are Orientals and hence have to be treated in other ways than 
the ones you've just been using. A wash of sentiment therefore disappeared as it en-
countered the unshakable definitions built up by Orientalist science, supported by 
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"Oriental" lore (e.g., the Diwan) supposed to be appropriate for it. The vocabulary of 
emotion dissipated as it sub¬mitted to the lexicographical police action of Orientalist 
science and even Orientalist art. An experience was dislodged by a dic¬tionary 
definition: one can almost see that happen in Marx's Indian essays, where what finally 
occurs is that something forces him to scurry back to Goethe, there to stand in his 
protective Orientalized Orient. 
In part, of course, Marx was concerned with vindicating his own theses on socio 
economic revolution; but in part also he seems to have had easy resource to a massed 
body of writing, both internally consolidated by Orientalism and put forward by it 
beyond the field, that controlled any statement made about the Orient. In Chapter One I 
tried to show how this control had had a general cultural history in Europe since 
antiquity; in this chapter my concern has been to show how in the nineteenth century a 
modern professional terminology and practice were created whose existence dominated 
discourse about the Orient, whether by Orientalists or non Orientalists. Sacy and Renan 
were instances of the way Orientalism fashioned, respectively, a body of texts and a 
philologically rooted process by which the Orient took on a discursive identity that 
made it unequal with the West. In using Marx as the case by which a non Orientalist's 
human engagements were first dissolved,then usurped by Orientalist generalizations, we 
find ourselves having to consider the process of lexicographical and institutional 
consolidation peculiar to Orientalism. What was this operation, by which whenever you 
discussed the Orient a formidable mechanism of omnicompetent definitions would 
present itself as the only one having suitable validity for your discussion? And since we 
must also show how this mechanism operated specifically (and effectively) upon 
personal human experiences that otherwise contradicted it, we must also show where 
they went and what forms they took, while they lasted. 
All this is a very difficult and complex operation to describe, at least as difficult 
and complex as the way any growing discipline crowds out its competitors and acquires 
authority for its traditions, methods, and institutions, as well as general cultural 
legitimacy for its statements, personalities, and agencies. But we can simplify a great 
deal of the sheer narrative complexity of the operation by specifying the kinds of 
experiences that Orientalism typically employed for its own ends and represented for its 
wider than professional audience. In essence these experiences continue the ones I 
described as having taken place in Sacy and Renan. But whereas those two scholars 
represent a wholly bookish Orientalism, since neither claimed any particular expertise 
with the Orient in situ, there is another tradition that claimed its legitimacy from the 
peculiarly compelling fact of residence in, actual existential contact with, the Orient. 
Anquetil, Jones, the Napoleonic expedition define the tradition's earliest contours, of 
course, and these will thereafter retain an unshakable influence on all Orientalist 
residents. These contours are the ones of European power: to reside in the Orient is to 
live the privileged life, not of an ordinary citizen, but of a representative European 
whose empire (French or British) contains the Orient in its military, economic, and 
above all, cultural arms.Oriental residence, and its scholarly fruits, are thereby fed into 
the bookish tradition of the textual attitudes we found in Renan and Sacy: together the 
two experiences will constitute a formidable library against which no one, not even 
Marx, can rebel and which no one can avoid. 
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Residence in the Orient involves personal experience and per¬sonal testimony to 
a certain extent. Contributions to the library of Orientalism and to its consolidation 
depend on how experience and testimony get converted from a purely personal 
document into the enabling codes of Orientalist science. In other words, within a text 
there has to take place a metamorphosis from personal to official statement; the record 
of Oriental residence and experience by a European must shed, or at least minimize, its 
purely autobio¬graphical and indulgent descriptions in favor of descriptions on which 
Orientalism in general and later Orientalists in particular can draw, build, and base 
further scientific observation and description. So one of the things we can watch for is a 
more explicit conversion than in Marx of personal sentiments about the Orient into 
official Orientalist statements. 
Now the situation is enriched and complicated by the fact that during the entire 
nineteenth century the Orient, and especially the Near Orient, was a favorite place for 
Europeans to travel in and write about. Moreover, there developed a fairly large body of 
Oriental style European literature very frequently based on personal experiences in the 
Orient. Flaubert comes to mind immediately as one prominent source of such literature; 
Disraeli, Mark Twain, and Kinglake are three other obvious examples. But what is of 
interest is the difference between writing that is converted from personal to professional 
Orientalism, and the second type, also based on residence and personal testimony, 
which remains "literature" and not science: it is this difference that I now want to 
explore. 
To be a European in the Orient always involves being a consciousness set apart 
from, and unequal with, its surroundings. But the main thing to note is the intention of 
this consciousness: What is it in the Orient for? Why does it set itself there even if, as is 
the case with writers like Scott, Hugo, and Goethe, it travels to the Orient for a very 
concrete sort of experience without actually leav¬ing Europe? A small number of 
intentional categories proposed them¬selves schematically. One: the writer who intends 
to use his residence for the specific task of providing professional Orientalism with 
scientific material, who considers his residence a form of scientific observation. Two: 
the writer who intends the same purpose but is less willing to sacrifice the eccentricity 
and style of his individual consciousness to impersonal Orientalist definitions. These 
latter do appear in his work, but they are disentangled from the personal vagaries of 
style only with difficulty. Three: the writer for whom a real or metaphorical trip to the 
Orient is the fulfillment of some deeply felt and urgent project. His text therefore is 
built on a personal aesthetic, fed and informed by the project. In categories two and 
three there is considerably more space than in one for the play of a personal or at least 
non Orientalist consciousness; if we take Edward William Lane's Manners and Customs 
of the Modern Egyptians as the pre eminent example of category one, Burton's 
Pilgrimage to al Madinah and Meccah as belonging to category two, and Nerval's 
Voyage en Orient as representing category three, the relative spaces left in the text for 
the exercise and display of authorial presence will be clear. 
Despite their differences, however, these three categories are not so separate 
from each other as one would imagine. Nor does each category contain "pure" 
representative types. For example, works in all three categories rely upon the sheer 
egoistic powers of the European consciousness at their center. In all cases the Orient is 
for the European observer, and what is more, in the category that contains Lane's 
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Egyptians, the Orientalist ego is very much in evidence, however much his style tries 
for impartial impersonality. Moreover, certain motifs recur consistently in all three 
types. The Orient as a place of pilgrimage is one; so too is the vision of Orient as 
spectacle, or tableau vivant. Every work on the Orient in these categories tries to 
characterize the place, of course, but what is of greater interest is the extent to which the 
work's internal structure is in some measure synonymous with a comprehensive 
interpretation (or an attempt at it) of the Orient. Most of the time, not surprisingly, this 
interpretation is a form of Romantic restructuring of the Orient, a re vision of it, which 
restores it redemptively to the present. Every interpretation, every structure created for 
the Orient, then, is a reinterpretation, a rebuilding of it. 
Having said that,we return directly to differences between the categories. Lane's 
book on the Egyptians was influential, it was frequently read and cited (by Flaubert 
among others), and it established its author's reputation as an eminent figure in 
Orientalist scholarship. In other words, Lane's authority was gained, not by virtue 
simply of what he said, but by virtue of how what he said could be adapted to 
Orientalism. He is quoted as a source of knowledge about Egypt or Arabia, whereas 
Burton or Flaubert were and are read for what they tell us about Burton and Flaubert 
over and above their knowledge of the Orient. The author function in Lane's Modern 
Egyptians is less strong than in the other categories because his work was disseminated 
into the profession, consolidated by it, institutionalized with it. The authorial identity in 
a work of professional discipline such as his is subordinated to the demands of the field, 
as well as to the demands of the subject matter. But this is not done simply, or without 
raising problems. 
Lane's classic, An Account of the Manners and Customs of the Modern 
Egyptians (1836), was the self conscious result of a series of works and of two periods 
of residence in Egypt (1825 1828 and 1833 1835). One uses the phrase "self conscious" 
with some emphasis here because the impression Lane wished to give was that his study 
was a work of immediate and direct, unadorned and neutral, description, whereas in fact 
it was the product of considerable editing (the work he wrote was not the one he finally 
published) and also of a considerable variety of quite special efforts. Nothing in his 
birth or background seemed to destine him for the Orient, except his methodical 
studiousness and his capacity for classical studies and for mathematics, which 
somewhat explain the apparent internal neatness of his book. His preface offers a series 
of interesting clues about what it was that he did for the book. He went to Egypt 
originally to study Arabic. Then, after making some notes about modern Egypt, he was 
encouraged to produce a systematic work on the country and its inhabitants by a 
committee of the Society for the Diffusion of Useful Knowledge. From being a random 
set of observations the work was changed into a document of useful knowledge, 
knowledge arranged for and readily accessible to anyone wishing to know the essentials 
of a foreign society. The preface makes it clear that such knowledge must somehow 
dispose of pre existing knowledge, as well as claim for itself particularly effective 
character: here Lane is the subtle polemicist. He must show initially that he did what 
others before him either could not or did not do, and then, that he was able to acquire 
information both authentic and perfectly correct. And thus his peculiar authority begins 
to emerge. 
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While Lane dallies in his preface with a Dr. Russell's "account of the people of 
Aleppo" (a forgotten work), it is obvious that the Description de I'Égypte is his main 
antecedent competition. But that work, confined by Lane to a long footnote, is 
mentioned in contemptuous quotation marks as "the great French work" on Egypt.   
That work was at once too philosophically general and too careless, Lane says; 
and Jacob Burckhardt's famous study was merely a collection of proverbial Egyptian 
wisdom, "bad tests of the morality of a people." Unlike the French and Burckhardt, 
Lane was able to submerge himself amongst the natives, to live as they did, to conform 
to their habits, and "to escape exciting, in strangers, any suspicion of . . . being a person 
who had no right to intrude among them." Lest that imply Lane's having lost his 
objectivity, he goes on to say that he conformed only to the words (his italics) of the 
Koran, and that he was always aware of his difference from an essentially alien 
culture.71 Thus while one portion of Lane's identity floats easily in the unsuspecting 
Muslim sea, a submerged part retains its secret European power, to comment on, 
acquire, possess everything around it. 
The Orientalist can imitate the Orient without the opposite being true. What he 
says about the Orient is therefore to be understood as description obtained in a one way 
exchange: as they spoke and behaved, he observed and wrote down. His power was to 
have existed amongst them as a native speaker, as it were, and also as a secret writer. 
And what he wrote was intended as useful knowledge, not for them, but for Europe and 
its various disseminative institutions. For that is one thing that Lane's prose never lets us 
forget: that ego, the first person pronoun moving through Egyptian customs, rituals, 
festivals, infancy, adulthood, and burial rites, is in reality both an Oriental masquerade 
and an Orientalist device for capturing and conveying valuable, otherwise inaccessible 
information. As narrator, Lane is both exhibit and exhibitor, winning two confidences at 
once, displaying two appetites for experience: the Oriental one for engaging 
companionship (or so it seems) and the Western one for authoritative, useful 
knowledge. 
Nothing illustrates this better than the last tripartite episode in the preface. Lane 
there describes his principal informant and friend, Sheikh Ahmed, as companion and as 
curiosity. Together the two pretend that Lane is a Muslim; yet only after Ahmed 
conquers his fear, inspired by Lane's audacious mimicry, can he go through the motions 
of praying by his side in a mosque. This final achievement is preceded by two scenes in 
which Ahmed is portrayed as a bizarre glass eater and a polygamist. 1n all three 
portions of the Sheikh Ahmed episode the distance between the Muslim and Lane 
increases, even as in the action itself it decreases. As mediator and translator, so to 
speak, of Muslim behavior,Lane ironically enters the Muslim pattern only far enough to 
be able to describe it in a sedate English prose. His identity as counterfeit believer and 
privileged European is the very essence of bad faith, for the latter undercuts the former 
in no uncertain way. Thus what seems to be factual reporting of what one rather 
peculiar Muslim does is made to appear by Lane as the candidly exposed center of all 
Muslim faith. No mind is given by Lane to the betrayal of his friendship with Ahmed or 
with the others who provide him with information.What matters is that the report seem 
accurate, general, and dispassionate, that the English reader be convinced that Lane was 
never infected with heresy or apostasy, and finally, that Lane's text cancel the human 
content of its subject matter in favor of its scientific validity. 
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It is for all these ends that the book is organized, not simply as the narrative of 
Lane's residence in Egypt but as narrative structure overwhelmed by Orientalist 
restructuring and detail. This, I think, is the central achievement of Lane's work. In 
outline and shape Modern Egyptians follows the routine of an eighteenth century novel, 
say one by Fielding. The book opens with an account of country and setting, followed 
by chapters on 'Personal Characteristics" and "Infancy and Early Education." Twenty 
five chapters on such things as festivals, laws, character, industry, magic, and domestic 
life precede the last section, "Death and Funeral Rites." On the face of it, Lane's 
argument is chronological and developmental. He writes about himself as the observer 
of scenes that follow the major divisions in the human lifetime: his model is the 
narrative pattern, as it is in Tom Jones with the hero's birth, adventures, marriage, and 
implied death. Only in Lane's text the narrative voice is ageless; his subject, however, 
the modern Egyptian, goes through the individual life cycle. This reversal, by which a 
solitary individual endows himself with timeless faculties and imposes on a society and 
people a personal life span, is but the first of several operations regulating what might 
have been the mere narration of travels in foreign parts, turning an artless text into an 
encyclopedia of exotic display and a playground for Orientalist scrutiny. 
Lane's control of his material is not only established through his dramatized 
double presence (as fake Muslim and genuine Westerner) and his manipulation of 
narrative voice and subject, but also through his use of detail. Each major section in 
each chapter is invariably introduced with some unsurprising general observation. For 
example, "it is generally observed that many of the most remarkable peculiarities in the 
manners, customs, and character of a nation are attributable to the physical peculiarities 
of the country."72 What follows confirms this easily the Nile, Egypt's "remarkably 
salubrious" climate, the peasant's "precise" labor. Yet instead of this leading to the next 
episode in narrative order, the detail is added to, and consequently the narrative 
fulfillment expected on purely formal grounds is not given. In other words, although the 
gross outlines of Lane's text conform to the narrative and causal sequence of birth life 
death, the special detail introduced during the sequence itself foils narrative movement. 
From a general observation, to a delineation of some aspect of Egyptian character, to an 
account of Egyptian childhood, adolescence, maturity, and senescence, Lane is always 
there with great detail to prevent smooth transitions. Shortly after we hear about Egypt's 
salubrious climate, for instance, we are informed that few Egyptians live beyond a few 
years, because of fatal illness, the absence of medical aid, and oppressive summer 
weather. Thereafter we are told that the heat "excites the Egyptian [an unqualified 
generalization] to intemperance in sensual enjoyments," and soon are bogged down in 
descriptions, complete with charts and line drawings, of Cairene architecture, 
decoration, fountains, and locks.When a narrative strain re emerges, it is clearly only as 
a formality. 
What prevents narrative order, at the very same time that narrative order is the 
dominating fiction of Lane's text, is sheer, overpowering, monumental description. 
Lane's objective is to make Egypt and the Egyptians totally visible, to keep nothing 
hidden from his reader, to deliver the Egyptians without depth, in swollen detail. As 
rapporteur his propensity is for sadomasochistic colossal tidbits: the self multilation of 
dervishes, the cruelty of judges, the blending of religion with licentiousness among 
Muslims, the excess of libidinous passions, and so on. Yet no matter how odd and 
perverse the event and how lost we become in its dizzying detail, Lane is ubiquitous, his 
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job being to reassemble the pieces and enable us to move on, albeit jerkily. To a certain 
extent he does this by just being a European who can discursively control the passions 
and excitements to which the Muslims are unhappily subject. But to an even greater 
extent, Lane's capacity to rein in his profuse subject matter with an unyielding bridle of 
discipline and detachment depends on his cold distance from Egyptian life and Egyptian 
productivity. 
The main symbolic moment occurs at the beginning of chapter 6, "Domestic 
Life Continued." By now Lane has adopted the narra¬tive convention of taking a walk 
through Egyptian life, and having reached the end of his tour of the public rooms and 
habits of an Egyptian household (the social and spatial worlds are mixed together by 
him), he begins to discuss the intimate side of home life. Immediately, he "must give 
some account of marriage and the marriage ceremonies." As usual, the account begins 
with a general observation: to abstain from marriage "when a man has attained a 
sufficient age, and when there is no just impediment, is esteemed by the Egyptians 
improper, and even disreputable." Without transi¬tion this observation is applied by 
Lane to himself, and he is found guilty. For one long paragraph he then recounts the 
pressures placed on him to get married, which he unflinchingly refuses. Finally, after a 
native friend even offers to arrange a mariage de convenance, also refused by Lane, the 
whole sequence is abruptly terminated with a period and a dash.63 He resumes his 
general discussion with another general observation. 
Not only do we have here a typical Lane esque interruption of the main narrative 
with untidy detail, we have also a firm and literal disengagement of the author from the 
productive processes of Oriental society. The mini narrative of his refusal to join the 
society he describes concludes with a dramatic hiatus: his story cannot continue, he 
seems to be saying, so long as he does not enter the intimacy of domestic life, and so he 
drops from sight as a candidate for it. He literally abolishes himself as a human subject 
by refusing to marry into human society. Thus he preserves his authoritative identity as 
a mock participant and bolsters the objec¬tivity of his narrative. If we already knew that 
Lane was a non-Muslim, we now know too that in order for him to become an 
Orientalist instead of an Oriental he had to deny himself the sensual enjoyments of 
domestic life. Moreover, he had also to avoid dating himself by entering the human life 
cycle. Only in this negative way could he retain his timeless authority as observer. 
Lane's choice was between living without "inconvenience and discomfort" and 
accomplishing his study of the modern Egyptians. The result of his choice is plainly to 
have made possible his defini¬tion of the Egyptians, since had he become one of them, 
his perspec¬tive would no longer have been antiseptically and asexually 
lexicographical. In two important and urgent ways, therefore, Lane gains scholarly 
credibility and legitimacy. First, by interfering with the ordinary narrative course of 
human life: this is the function of his colossal detail, in which the observing intelligence 
of a foreigner can introduce and then piece together massive information. The 
Egyptians are disemboweled for exposition, so to speak, then put together 
admonishingly by Lane. Second, by disengaging from the generation of Egyptian 
Oriental life: this is the function of his subduing his animal appetite in the interest of 
disseminating information, not in and for Egypt, but in and for European learning at 
large. To have achieved both the imposition of a scholarly will upon an untidy reality 
and an intentional shift away from the place of his residence to the scene of his 
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scholarly reputation is the source of his great fame in the annals of Orientalism. Useful 
knowledge such as his could only have been obtained, formulated, and diffused by such 
denials. 
Lane's two other major works, his never completed Arabic lexicon and his 
uninspired translation of the Arabian Nights, consolidated the system of knowledge 
inaugurated by Modern Egyptians. In both of his later works his individuality has 
disappeared entirely as a creative presence, as of course has the very idea of a narrative 
work. Lane the man appears only in the official persona of annotator and retranslator 
(the Nights) and impersonal lexicographer. From being an author contemporary with his 
subject matter, Lane became as Orientalist scholar of classical Arabic and classical 
Islam its survivor. But it is the form of that survival which is of interest. For Lane's 
legacy as a scholar mattered not to the Orient, of course, but to the institutions and 
agencies of his European society. And these were either academic the official 
Orientalist societies, institutions, and agencies or they were extraacademic in very 
particular ways, figuring in the work of later Europeans resident in the Orient. 
If we read Lane's Modern Egyptians, not as a source of Oriental lore, but as a 
work directed towards the growing organization of academic Orientalism, we will find 
it illuminating. The subordination of genetic ego to scholarly authority in Lane 
corresponds exactly to the increased specialization and institutionalization of 
knowledge about the Orient represented by the various Oriental societies. The Royal 
Asiatic Society was founded a decade before Lane's book appeared, but its committee of 
correspondence whose "objects were to receive intelligence and inquiries relating to the 
arts, sciences, literature, history and antiquities" of the Orient74    the structural 
recipient of Lane's fund of information, processed and formulated as it was. As for the 
diffusion of such work as Lane's, there were not only the various societies of useful 
knowledge but also, in an age when the original Orientalist program of aiding 
commerce and trade with the Orient had become exhausted, the specialized learned 
societies whose products were works displaying the potential (if not actual) values of 
disinterested scholarship. Thus, a program of the Societe asiatique states: To compose 
or to print grammars, dictionaries, and other elementary books recognized as useful or 
indispensable for the study of those languages taught by appointed professors [of 
Oriental languages]; by subscriptions or by other means to contribute to the publication 
of the same kind of work undertaken in France or abroad; to acquire manuscripts, or to 
copy either completely or in part those that are to be found in Europe, to translate or to 
make extracts from them, to multiply their number by reproducing them either by 
engraving or by lithography; to make it possible for the authors of useful works on 
geography, history, the arts, and the sciences to acquire the means for the public to 
enjoy the fruits of their nocturnal labors; to draw the attention of the public, by means 
of a periodic collection devoted to Asiatic literature, to the scientific, literary, or poetic 
productions of the Orient and those of the same sort that regularly are produced in 
Europe, to those facts about the Orient that could be relevant to Europe, to those 
discoveries and works of all kinds of which the Oriental peoples could become the 
subject: these are the objectives proposed for and by the Societe asiatique. 
Orientalism organized itself systematically as the acquisition of Oriental 
material and its regulated dissemination as a form of specialized knowledge. One 
copied and printed works of grammar, one acquired original texts, one multiplied their 
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number and diffused them widely, even dispensed knowledge in periodic form. It was 
into and for this system that Lane wrote his work, and sacrificed his ego. The mode in 
which his work persisted in the archives of Orientalism was provided for also. There 
was to be a "museum," Sacy said,a vast depot of objects of all kinds, of drawings, of 
original books, maps, accounts of voyages, all offered to those who wish to give 
themselves to the study of [the Orient]; in such a way that each of these students would 
be able to feel himself transported as if by enchantment into the midst of, say, a 
Mongolian tribe or of the Chinese race, whichever he might have made the object of his 
studies.... It is possible to say . . . that after the publication of elementary books on . . . 
the Oriental languages, nothing is more important than to lay the cornerstone of this 
museum, which I consider a living commentary upon and interpretation [truchement] of 
the dictionaries.75 
Truchement derives nicely from the Arabic turjaman, meaning "interpreter," 
"intermediary," or "spokesman." On the one hand, Orientalism acquired the Orient as 
literally and as widely as possible; on the other, it domesticated this knowledge to the 
West, filtering it through regulatory codes, classifications, specimen cases, periodical 
reviews, dictionaries, grammars, commentaries, editions, translations, all of which 
together formed a simulacrum of the Orient and reproduced it materially in the West, 
for the West. The Orient, in short, would be converted from the personal, sometimes 
garbled testimony of intrepid voyagers and residents into impersonal definition by a 
whole array of scientific workers. It would be converted from the consecutive 
experience of individual research into a sort of imaginary museum without walls, where 
everything gathered from the huge distances and varieties of Oriental culture became 
categorically Oriental. It would be reconverted, restructured from the bundle of 
fragments brought back piecemeal by explorers, expeditions, commissions, armies, and 
merchants into lexicographical, bibliographical, departmentalized, and textualized 
Orientalist sense. By the middle of the nineteenth century the Orient had become, as 
Disraeli said, a career, one in which one could remake and restore not only the Orient 
but also oneself. 
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